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Practicing Practical Wisdom
by Deborah J. CantreH*
and Kenneth Sharpe"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Here is what we believe and what we set out to test: Wisdom is not an
innate character trait; no one automatically is wise; and wisdom is
learned and acquired. More importantly, one can learn and acquire
wisdom intentionally and skillfully-one can practice it. And, if the
practice is structured in particular ways, the practice will improve one's
capacities to act with wisdom. For lawyers, and even more so for law
students, that should be heartening. For legal educators, the ability to
improve one's capacity to act with wisdom should be a call to action.
We set out to discern the best conditions a legal educator could use to
actually cultivate wisdom in law students. As a starting point, we
needed to refine what kind of wisdom we were striving to cultivate. We
chose to situate ourselves within the Aristotelian tradition, which
embraces the idea of wisdom-in-action, or "practical wisdom."' Practical
wisdom is dependent on the particularities and context of the specific
choices made or problems solved.2 It does not remain aloof or removed
from the facts on the ground.' Practical wisdom does not try to abstract

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. We want to express
tremendous gratitude to the students in our legal ethics classes who so readily and
profoundly engaged with us in our efforts to practice practical wisdom. Without them, this
Article would not exist. We received rich feedback from our colleagues at the University
of Colorado works-in-progress series. We would also like to particularly thank Brad
Bernthal, Tammy Kuennen, Helen Norton, and Amy Uelmen.
** William R. Kenan Jr. Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College. His
research on practical wisdom has been supported by the John Templeton Foundation.
1. See BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO
DO THE RIGHT THING 5 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 5-6.
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itself from context.' Furthermore, and critically, practical wisdom
always attends to the normative valence of context, thereby also mooring
itself to higher order values.'
The first step in our project was to reconsider the legal ethics
literature about professional identity and to bring together two rich
strands of that literature. We labelled the first strand the "formation"
strand, and it is a long-standing exploration about how the professional
identity of a lawyer is formed both in law school and beyond.' We
called the second strand the "role" strand. It, too, is a long-standing
exploration, but it has focused on larger normative questions regarding
the appropriate role of a lawyer in a democratic and just society.'
Interestingly, the formation strand seldom has explicitly considered the
"role" question, while the role strand seldom has explicitly considered
the "formation" question. However, practical wisdom demands both
questions be answered concurrently-one can only practice practical
wisdom if one knows toward what aim one is striving.
Our next step was to more carefully discern the component parts of
practical wisdom. In other words, what particular capacities does a
lawyer need to cultivate to achieve practical wisdom? We hypothesized
that practical wisdom requires a lawyer to have at least three specific

4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. Some examples from this rich strand of literature include the following: WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007)
(often referred to as "The Carnegie Report"); Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics
Class Through Simulation: The Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1995); Lois R. Lupica, Professional Responsibility
Redesigned: Sparking a Dialogue Between Students and the Bar, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 71
(2004); James R. Elkins, Symptoms Exposed When Legalists Engage in Moral Discourse:
Reflections on the Difficulties of Talking Ethics, 17 VT. L. REV. 353 (1993); Neil Hamilton,
Fostering ProfessionalFormation (Professionalism):Lessons From the Carnegie Foundation's Five Studies on EducatingProfessionals, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763 (2012); Thomas
D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
409 (1998); Paula M. Young, Teaching ProfessionalEthics to Lawyers and Mediators Using
Active Learning Techniques, 40 Sw. L. REV. 127 (2010).
7. Some of the well-recognized literature in this strand includes the following: MONROE
H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (3d ed. 2004); GERALD P.
LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); W. BRADLEY
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practiceof Law
as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1979); Norman W. Spaulding,
ReinterpretingProfessionalIdentity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2003); Lucie E. White, To Learn
and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 699
(1988).
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capacities: the capacity for empathy, the capacity for compassion, and
the capacity to situate the endeavor within a broader web of relationships other than just the dyadic relationship between the lawyer and
client (what we called "relationality"). We explore each of those
capacities more fully below.
Our final step was to craft and test a pedagogy that truly allowed the
practice of practical wisdom within the context of a law school legal
ethics class. We took the lesson from research on adult learning
seriously-that adults learn best when they can use their own experiences to form the basis of their learning.' We also took the lesson that
practical wisdom demands actual context seriously. Thus, we determined that all of our teaching and learning would start from lawyering
narratives that students wrote about or orally shared in every class, and
that other legal ethics texts and cases would be integrated into these
narratives.' While that meant as teachers we would not actually know
in advance how a class would unfold, we always knew that we would be
working with deeply engaging material for the students. Further, we
provided prompts prior to class for the narrative assignments so that
students' stories were usually of a piece. In that way, we had some
helpful focus that was still flexible and dynamic. Finally, we introduced
our students to mindfulness training"o and consistently relied on it to
ensure that we cultivated another important feature both of adult
learning and of the development of wisdom-reflective and iterative
practice.
Below, we share our story and our students' stories of practicing
practical wisdom.
II.

FRAMING THE INQUIRY ABOUT PRACTICAL WISDOM

How can law schools give students the practice they need to learn
practical wisdom? Implicit in that question is the claim that practical
wisdom is a competency that can and must be cultivated in an applied
way. In other words, abstract or general conversations about the topic

8.

See generally MALCOM KNOWLES, THE ADULT LEARNER: A NEGLECTED SPECIES (4th

ed. 1990).
9. For a compelling example of narrative as a tool for developing practical wisdom, see
Timothy W. Floyd & John Gallagher, Legal Ethics, Narrative, and ProfessionalIdentity:
The Story of David Spaulding, 59 MERCER L. REV. 941 (2008).
10. There are a myriad of particular techniques that can be found under the umbrella
of "mindfulness training," almost all of which spring from some form of Buddhist
meditation. See generally JAY MICHAELSON, EVOLVING DHARMA: MEDITATION, BUDDHISM,

AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENLIGHTENMENT (2013). "Mindfulness" typically refers to
a habit of mental attention that is fulsome and nonjudgmental. See id. at xv (listing
several different definitions of "mindfulness").
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of practical wisdom do not build the capacity to behave in a practically
wise manner. However, simply insisting that students participate in
some hands-on legal practice (whether through law school clinical
programs or outside externships) also likely does not cultivate practical
wisdom on its own.n To answer the quandary of how law students
might practice practical wisdom, we launched an inquiry along several
We thought it important to investigate the range of
dimensions.
possibilities for what it generally means for a lawyer to be practically
wise. We also wanted to be clear about what more specific competencies
are imbedded in the idea of practical wisdom. And, we wanted to
investigate what kind of pedagogical design would push students to
actually practice practical wisdom in a classroom setting.
A lawyer with practical intelligence knows how to give guidance about
conduct related to real problems people face and how to translate
general laws and principles into concrete guidance for action.' 2 That
practical intelligence becomes practical wisdom if the lawyer knows how
to consider multiple viewpoints relevant in the particular situation, to
discern the full range of ethical and moral dimensions of the situation,
and to consider all of that in light of the broad normative aims or
purposes of the lawyering profession."
The philosophy based definition of practical wisdom understands
practical wisdom as a virtue and as a competency.' 4 In other words,
practical wisdom requires a lawyer to consider the particular facts
presented by a problem in light of more general values; to do so one
takes the perspective of the lawyer's client as well as any other person
involved in the problem." The lawyer does not tailor advice so that the
client's interests automatically or unquestioningly are served over other
interests. 1 6 Instead, the lawyer's advice considers the client's interest,
the other interests involved, and the relevant norms." As Anthony
Kronman has argued, practical wisdom is "a certain calmness in [the
lawyer's] deliberations, together with a balanced sympathy toward the

11. One of the authors of this Article previously argued that a clinic focused on legal
ethics can be a potent setting in which law students learn practical wisdom. See Deborah
J. Cantrell, Teaching PracticalWisdom, 55 S.C. L. REV. 391, 393 (2004).
12. Robert J. Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 347, 35152 (1998). The idea of practical intelligence was developed by psychologist Robert J.
Sternberg. Sternberg distinguished between practical intelligence and wisdom, noting that
wisdom demanded more than just practical intelligence. See generally id.
13. See id. at 353.
14. See id. at 358.
15. Id. at 353.
16. Id. at 356.
17. Id.
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various concerns of which his situation (or the situation of his client)
requires that he take account. These are qualities as much of feeling as
of thought.""s The "balanced sympathy" to which Kronman refers
requires the lawyer to advise in a way that capaciously engages the
interests of the individuals involved as well as considers broader
systemic interests, all of which invariably include ethical and moral
dimensions. 9
Psychologists studying intelligence and wisdom similarly emphasize
the importance of norms and the capacity to balance." People demonstrate wisdom when they consider intrapersonal, interpersonal, and
extrapersonal interests and balance those interests in deciding how to
adapt, shape, or select a particular environment in a way designed to
achieve "a common good for all relevant stakeholders."21 For example,
psychologist Robert Sternberg has articulated a balance theory of
wisdom.22 Sternberg argues that wisdom is a particular kind of
practical intelligence.23 In his research, Sternberg looked at practitioners in various fields and gave them a series of problems to solve to
determine a measurement for practical intelligence.2 4 Sternberg found
that practical intelligence includes an ability to solve problems
practically, verbal skills, "intellectual balance and integration, goal
orientation and attainment, contextual intelligence, and fluid
Sternberg further found a subset of skills he labeled and
thought."
classified as wisdom including "reasoning ability, sagacity, learning from
ideas and environment, judgment, expeditious use of information, and
perspicacity."2 6 Based on his research, Sternberg proposed that wisdom
differs from general practical intelligence in that wisdom is a balancing
of interests with the goal of achieving a common good.2 7 Practical
intelligence does not require a balancing of interests and can include a
decision to be self-interested.2 8 Furthermore, Sternberg's research

18.

ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,

THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 16 (1993).
19. Id.
20. Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, supra note 12, at 347.
21. Robert J. Sternberg, Intelligence and Wisdom, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE 631,
638 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2000).
22. Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, supra note 12, at 347, 353.
23. Id. at 351.
24. Id. at 351-52.
25. Sternberg, Intelligence and Wisdom, supra note 21, at 632.
26. Id.
27. Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, supra note 12, at 353-54.
28. Id.
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demonstrates that wisdom is normative and presumes a set of values.29
Both Kronman and Sternberg articulate practical wisdom as requiring
the ability to balance.ao When we think of law and of lawyering, the
word "balancing" often brings to mind the idea of two sides. We think
of the image of Lady Justice holding her scales and we are reminded to
pay attention to each side of the scale as we strive towards a just
outcome. However, the idea of balancing two sides is too crabbed as
applied to practical wisdom, including the ways in which Kronman and
Sternberg have described it. The balancing required by practical wisdom
is multi-faceted and more accurately described as a process that first
requires the fulsome identification of the facts, players, and issues and
dilemmas presented, followed by a consideration of the range of choices
available, followed by a weighing and prioritizing of interests achieved
with different outcomes." Because legal problems so commonly get
presented only as dyadic transactions or disputes, that structural
misassumption creates a strong risk that practical wisdom will be
misunderstood as the practice of balancing one side against another.
Further, to some degree, the ways that both Kronman and Sternberg
investigate practical wisdom result in it becoming a kind of "end state."
They ask the questions, "What is this thing called practical wisdom?"
and "What features should we look for in a person who has achieved the
state of being practically wise?" Those questions are critical, and the
answers that Kronman and Sternberg provide are useful markers one
can use. What the focus on end state misses, however, is that it is
equally important to think about practical wisdom as a process." If a
person who is practically wise shows perspicacity, as Sternberg suggests,
then what process and what techniques did that person use to gain such
perspicacity? We took up exactly that critical process question-what
does the practice of practical wisdom look like and what competencies
are required?
Encouraging students to learn the wisdom needed to practice practical
wisdom is partly a problem of pedagogy, and we will turn to that in a
moment. Nevertheless, there is also a deeper (and prior) conceptual

29. Id. at 358.
30. See KRONMAN, supra note 18, at 87; Sternberg, A Balance Theory of Wisdom, supra
note 12, at 347.
31. See Sternberg, Intelligence and Wisdom, supra note 21, at 637.
32. To be sure, both Kronman and Sternberg acknowledge ways in which one learns
practical wisdom. For example, Sternberg's research includes descriptions of "end states"
that result from actions. See id. at 635. Sternberg describes the concept of "tacit
knowledge," which he defines as the "knowing how." Id. Tacit knowledge is more than
knowing a particular fact; tacit knowledge develops from action and experience. Id. at 63536.
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problem that appears in the literature about legal ethics. One strand in
that literature emphasizes the importance of professional formation:
professional identity can and should be taught and developed." There
are different visions of the pedagogy of formation and debates about
whether law schools do it well. It is generally agreed that law schools
are really good at teaching students to "think like a lawyer."" It is not
generally agreed that law schools are good at forming practically wise
lawyers.35
When one is concerned with forming practically wise lawyers, one
must widen the debates about professional formation from a focus only
on teaching processes to a focus including inquiries about purpose or
aim. A conversation about practical wisdom demands a normative
commitment, and much of the professional formation literature leaves
wide open a question critical to the true learning of practical wisdom-"formed for what?"36 For a lawyer to exercise practical wisdom,
that exercise must be aimed at some purpose-at some "telos."3
Katherine Kruse captures that critical question when she writes:
In exercising professional judgment, a lawyer draws on an implicit
underlying understanding of professional role that strikes a balance
between competing professional values, even if the balancing process
remains under the surface. A lawyer's exercise of professional
judgment thus contains within it an operative theory about the role of
lawyers in the legal system and in society.38
Fortunately, there is a second strand in the legal ethics literature that
can be helpful here: it considers what the appropriate role of the lawyer
is in our society and how that role drives what is considered to be

33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
34. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1-3.
35. Id. at 8.
36. The ethics formation literature regularly acknowledges that lawyering has ethical
and moral components. See generally LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 7.
However, the literature usually does not delve into the particulars and, instead, implicitly
assumes that there is one agreed upon vision of lawyering. There have been voices
scattered throughout who have argued that professional formation processes must always
first be embedded in a normative point of view. See, e.g., David Luban & Michael
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31,
31 (1995); Daisy Floyd, PracticalWisdom: Reimagining Legal Education, 10 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 195, 196 (2012).
37. "Telos" is the Greek word meaning "[e]nd, purpose, ultimate object or aim." OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 742 (2d ed. 1989).
38. Katherine R. Kruse, Professional Role and Professional Judgment: Theory and
Practice in Legal Ethics, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 250, 251 (2011).
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appropriate and ethical lawyering." The role literature is longstanding, robust, and nuanced.40 The literature reflects many of the more
general core normative debates about what constitutes a successful (and
ethical) individual life and what constitutes a successful (and ethical)
collective life.41 We focused with our students on four views of what
the role of a lawyer could (or should) be. We noted at the outset that our
choices of four normative visions for the role of a lawyer were not an
exclusive list of choices. We also noted that our descriptions of the four
roles in some ways simplified and made static what in practice is a more
complicated and dynamic experience. Nonetheless, each of the visions
prioritizes certain normative principles over others. What we wanted
most was for our students to see how changing normative priorities
could lead a lawyer to make different ethical decisions. We asked
students to wrestle with the critiques of each view as well so that they
truly understood normative assumptions imbedded in each view. On a
regular basis, we tried to notice in class discussions when and how it
was that a lawyer could generally prefer one of the normative roles but
could reasonably choose to act more consistently with a different role
because a particular context offered up reasons for a lawyer to prefer the
normative prioritizing choices of the different role.
The first role we considered commonly is labeled the "Dominant View"
of lawyering. 2 Under the Dominant View, a lawyer's role is conceived
in the context of the American adversary system." That system
presumes the fairest, most accurate, and therefore just, way to resolve
disputes is for a neutral decisionmaker (judge or jury) to hear each side
in the dispute tell her story in as robust a manner possible and to
critique the other side as thoroughly as possible.4 4 Through such
vigorous advocacy the "truth should out." Because the adversary system
has specialized rules and procedures, there needs to be experts available
for disputants to use to navigate the system." Thus, the lawyer's role

39.
40.
41.
42.
View."

Id.
See id.
See id. at 252.
See SIMON, supra note 7, at 7. Simon is credited for coining the label of "Dominant
Id. at 9-10. Others have called the view the "Standard Conception" of lawyering.

See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at xix-xx.

43. SIMON, supra note 7, at 8.
44. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 56-58 (describing the key
features of the adversary system); see also Deborah J. Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do With
It?: Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy from the PreacherMartin Luther King,
Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 296, 302-03 (2010) (providing an overview of the Dominant
View).
45. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 56-57.
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is to be a vigorous, thorough, and diligent advocate for the client." The
lawyer owes loyalty to the client and follows the client's directions and
wishes as fully as the boundaries of law permit." The role is to be an
agent for the client."4 Thus, the attorney is not accountable for the
client's moral choices or choices of action, even if those choices are
reprehensible to the lawyer, so long as the client's choices are legal."
Supporters of the Dominant View highlight its ethos of service-a
lawyer who truly commits to this view does so by fully embracing their
obligation to be in service to a client and to be a clean and clear conduit
in representing the client's views and goals."o The principle of protecting client autonomy strongly animates the Dominant View. Students for
whom this view was appealing had to face the critique that the
adversary system that exists in real life is not the ideal contained in the
Dominant View." In the real world, clients (and lawyers) can and do
choose to pursue goals other than letting the truth out. Clients do not
always have equally-skilled lawyers, and many persons do not have
lawyers. Thus, the neutral decisionmaker often may not learn the best
and the worst about each side's position and may be pressed to make a
decision with imperfect information. Further, students, as developing
lawyers themselves, had to face the critique that basic psychological and
cognitive processes regularly interfere with and impede their ability to
be a neutral conduit for their clients.52

46. Id. at 57.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. David Luban refers to this feature as the "principle of non-accountability." Id. at
7.
50. See Spaulding, Reinterpreting ProfessionalIdentity, supra note 7. Other defenses
of the standard conception of lawyering include Stephen L. Pepper's classic defense, see
Stephen L. Pepper, Counselingat the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995), and FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note

7; cf Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 697, 698 (1988) ("[L]awyers claim that the adversary ethic is an ethic of service to the
autonomy-the self rule or the freedom--of clients.").
51. For a thorough-going critique of the underlying assumptions of the adversary
system, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 67-103; see also Shaffer, The

Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, supra note 50.
52. See generally PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING,
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY

MAKERS (2010); see also Robert K Vischer, Moral Engagement Without the "MoralLaw":
A Post-Canons View of Attorneys' Moral Accountability, 2008 J. PROF. LAw. 213 (2008)
(focusing in particular on the ways in which lawyers and clients might mistake the moral
valence of their conversations).
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The next view we considered is the "Rebellious Lawyering" View."
Like Dominant View lawyers, practicing Rebellious Lawyers take their
role as an agent or a conduit for the client's choices seriously, and take
seriously that the client is the expert about whatever challenge or
problem she faces.54 Rebellious Lawyering is consonant with the
Dominant View in that both highly privilege client autonomy. However,
Rebellious Lawyering is deeply skeptical about most lawyers' skillfulness
in allowing the client to make decisions in a truly autonomous way
because lawyers are readily affected by cognitive biases."
Rebellious Lawyering posits that both the elite, privileged backgrounds
of most lawyers and the training that happens in law schools cultivate
a kind of arrogance in lawyers that they are the true experts about law
and legal process.56 Thus, instead of protecting client autonomy, most
traditionally-trained lawyers subordinate their clients and interject the
lawyers' own assessments and conclusions into the decision-making and
problem-solving. Rebellious Lawyering calls on lawyers to be aware of,
and reject, such dominating behavior and to return to a pure form of
being an agent for the client-principal."
Rebellious Lawyers are subversive in another way, too. They situate
their work exclusively within communities that are underserved and
subordinated because a commitment to justice should include a
commitment to disrupting and changing the elite power structure."8
Rebellious Lawyers do not prioritize making change through existing

53. Gerald L6pez created the phrase "Rebellious Lawyering." See L6PEZ, supra note 7.
54. Id. at 26-27.
55. L6pez called non-rebellious lawyering "regnant" lawyering. Id. at 24-25 (listing
characteristics of "regnant" lawyering).
56. See, e.g., Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty
Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1024 (1994) ("There are ... significant dangers
when middle class lawyers get intimately involved in the task of organizing the poor. More
articulate, better educated, aggressive by nature and training, some lawyers tend to
dominate newly formed groups, even when they try not to . . .").
57. See Gerald L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) (arguing that lawyers must
understand clients as experts about their own lives).
58. See generally Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and
Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992) (critically examining the
effectiveness of regnant versus rebellious, collectivized lawyering); Muneer I. Ahmad,
Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999
(2007); Sameer Asher, PublicInterest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1879 (2007); see also Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road By Walking: Immigrant Workers,
the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407
(1995); Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
1383 (2009); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1995).
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structures like courts or legislatures because those institutions
themselves are so fully captured by the elites determined to preserve
their power."
As students considered the appeal of Rebellious Lawyering, we asked
them to consider whether that role situated lawyers in such a subservient position that they would no longer effectively bring their expertise
into conversations with clients. 0 We also considered how the view of
Rebellious Lawyering was helpful (or unhelpful) in settings in which the
client had no choice but to engage with traditional legal institutions,
such as the field of criminal defense.e"
The third view we discussed is referred to as the "Moral Activist" or
"Morally Engaged" View of lawyering and began with work by David
Luban." Under that normative view, a lawyer's role requires moral
behavior that is consistent with the moral behavior required of every
member of society. 3 Unlike the Dominant View, in which a lawyer is
not accountable for a client's moral choices and must push the client's
goals vigorously, the Morally Engaged View requires a lawyer to actively
consider one's own moral stance towards the work the lawyer is asked
to perform." The lawyer must also engage the client in respectful
conversations about the client's moral choices and how those choices

59. As part of our class readings about Rebellious Lawyering, we also read literature
about "cause lawyering." We defined cause lawyering as lawyering where the primary
commitment is to a political or ideological goal and where lawyering actions prioritize
greater social or political change over outcomes that are beneficial solely for an individual
client. Cause lawyering was one of several examples of other possible normative frames
we explored with students. We noted how one might consider oneself both a Rebellious
Lawyer and a Cause Lawyer but that one might be a Cause Lawyer without being a
Rebellious Lawyer. We also noted how one could have a primary commitment to political
or social change while also situating oneself in several of the four normative visions on
which we focused. Throughout, we pressed our students to unpack the underlying
normative principles that they were prioritizing rather than just to label their lawyering
reflexively and unthoughtfully.
60. For a critique of L6pez's view, see Deborah J. Cantrell, Lawyers, Loyalty and Social
Change, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 941 (2012) (labeling the kind of role L6pez calls for as one
that requires a lawyer to be hyper-loyal to a client and describing the negative consequences of such hyper-loyalty).
61. We asked students to consider whether some settings actually required a lawyer
to try and robustly persuade her client to change the client's mind. See Abbe Smith, The
Lawyer's "Conscience" and the Limits of Persuasion, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 479 (2007)
(arguing that a criminal defense lawyer should aggressively try and persuade her client to
avoid losing physical liberty).
62. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 104-27.
63. Id. at 108.
64. Id. at 154-56.
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affect the client's conduct and the lawyer's conduct." The fact that a
person is a "lawyer" or a "client" does not permit the person to act
outside of expected moral and ethical behavior." The Morally Engaged
View argues that just and fair results are most likely to occur when all
of the participants in a legal matter, lawyers included, pay attention to
their own moral and ethical choices and respectfully, but robustly,
engage with others' choices."
Of course, our students worried about their clients' abilities to feel
equally situated in the relationship with them as attorneys. They also
worried that the Morally Engaged View would necessarily cause them
to disempower their clients. We regularly considered what a lawyer
might actually say that would invite a moral conversation with a client
that ensured the client did not feel like the client was being talked down
to or scolded. We also talked about how and when we assumed
something about our client's moral motivations-either good or bad-and
why those assumptions might matter in achieving a good and ethical
result."
The final normative role view that we discussed is what we have
called the "Relational" View of lawyering.69 The Relational View is
consonant with the Morally Engaged View of lawyering in that it
requires lawyers to comport themselves with generally-expected moral
and ethical behavior.o The Relational View expands beyond the
Morally Engaged View in that it asks lawyers to situate themselves

65. See Vischer, supra note 52, at 222.
66. Id. at 214-15.
67. Id. at 220-23.
68. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 13-15, 94 (1991) (describing

modern legal ethics as a conversation not about being a good person but about rights and,
later, articulating that a key goal for a lawyer should be to help others become good
persons).
69. The phrase "relational lawyering" is a nascent one. See Russell G. Pearce & Eli
Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach Would Improve
Professional Rules and Roles, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513 (2012); see also Cantrell, Social
Change, supra note 60, at 941 (arguing that cause lawyers and clients would be more
effective if they took a relational approach to their work). Many would credit Thomas L.
Shaffer for laying the foundation for the Relational View of lawyering. See Thomas L.
Shaffer, How I Changed My Mind, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 291, 296-97 (1994) (discussing the
fact of relationality in human life and in lawyering). For a more expansive overview of the
idea of relationality and the law, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAw'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL
THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW (2011).

70.

Cantrell, Social Change, supra note 60, at 963.
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within a relevant web of relationships and not just the dyadic relationship between lawyer and client."
Under the Relational View, the focal point is not just the client.7 2 A
Relational lawyer understands herself to have moral and ethical
obligations not only to the client but also to the myriad of other persons
who are involved in, or affected by, the issue that the client wishes to
address." The Relational View expects that the lawyer is carefully
attentive to the client's perspective and goals." However, the Relational lawyer makes sure that she assists the client in perceiving the
contours of the issue from multiple perspectives and in that way pushes
the client to consider the most capacious set of goals and outcomes
(competing or consonant). 5 Further, the Relational lawyer is attentive
to the range of emotions present in the situation, embraces the positive
possibilities of those emotions, and helps the client navigate the negative
consequences of emotions.
The Relational View starts with the
descriptive fact that no one is ever in an exclusively dyadic relationship. 7
Thus, one's choices always have consequences that ripple
throughout one's web of relationships. A lawyer working within the
Relational View provides the wisest advice and counsel only by working
across the fullest web of relationships presented in the legal matter."
For those students for whom client autonomy was paramount, the
Relational View triggered worries that a lawyer would replace the

71. See id. at 964-65.
72. Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do With It?, supra note 44, at 331.
73. For an example of how a relational lawyer might consider multiple perspectives and
help her client to do so as well, see id. at 330-33.
74. Id. at 331-32.
75. Cantrell, Social Change, supra note 60, at 963-64.
76. For an example of what this navigation might look like for a client faced with an
emotionally-charged and complicated problem, see Deborah J. Cantrell, Re-Problematizing
Anger in Domestic Violence Advocacy, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 837, 852-54
(2013).
77. Cantrell, Social Change, supra note 60, at 963.
78. Throughout our conversations about the four normative visions on which we
focused, we conversed about the idea of "client-centered" lawyering. We noted how lawyers
in each of the four normative visions would likely say that they were client-centered
because each view embraced the idea that a lawyer wishes to be in service to a client.
Throughout class discussions, we pushed students to articulate more carefully on what
underlying normative principle(s) they were relying when they said they were being clientcentered. For example, did a student believe in the effectiveness of the adversary system
and, thus, were lawyers acting in a client-centered manner by spending time to carefully
prepare the client to be best able to rebuff the other side's cross-examination? Or, did a
student believe that a client could only reach the "best" decision if the lawyer transparently
and explicitly checked in the with client about the moral dimensions of the problem and,
thus, the student was "client-centered" by having such conversations?
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client's wishes with wishes of some other view represented within the
web of relationships. Once again, we pushed students to move from
abstract worry to concrete actions, and we pressed them to compare and
contrast their own behaviors to discern whether they did or did not
replace their client's wishes with wishes of others. The crux move here,
as with the other normative views, was to insist that students situate
their normative inquiries within the context of their own experiences.
In thinking about a pedagogical design through which students could
practice practical wisdom, we sought to bring the formation and role
strands together. We wanted students to answer the question "formed
for what" by encouraging them to recognize that there were different
legitimate roles for a lawyer, each of which made some claim to being
the "best" at achieving a higher order moral goal like justice, fairness,
or dignity. Because each role implies different and legitimate higher
aims for lawyering, those aims necessarily shape that practical wisdom
must be the following: the exercise of practical wisdom for a Rebellious
lawyer very well could be different from the practical wisdom of a
Dominant View lawyer. We wanted students to notice, argue about, and
ultimately respect those equally legitimate, but competing, roles of the
lawyer. We wanted to treat professional formation as the normative
process that it is - and should be, rather than treating it simply as a
technical process.
By acknowledging the importance of the different roles, we could
design a pedagogy to encourage the students to learn the competency
and the will (or the habits and the disposition) to successfully make wise
judgments that are dependent on contested visions of the lawyer's telos.
Concretely, this meant encouraging students to recognize and analyze
the "First Principles" that guided their practices as student attorneys.
For example, were students prioritizing individual client autonomy or
prioritizing a commitment to a particular political ideology? We did not
want students to start with reading the "black letter law" on legal
ethics-the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)-without
first understanding that they would need to interpret those Rules in
light of their normative commitments and First Principles."
Thus, our pedagogy for encouraging the practice of practical wisdom
was deeply influenced by the role strand of the literature regarding the
practice of legal ethics. But, the professional formation strand of the
literature emphasized something that also was important to us: practical
wisdom is a competency (or habit) that a student can cultivate and
acquire." Practical wisdom is multifaceted and includes the abilities,
79.
80.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0 to 8.5 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1998).
Lupica, supra note 6, at 72.
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among others, to analyze a situation from multiple viewpoints, establish
rapport with a client, determine competing possible courses of conduct,
articulate any ethical or moral concerns raised by the situation, assess
the benefits of various outcomes, and proceed with some action."' The
question is the following: How might one learn the competencies that
help one cultivate the disposition to act wisely? Here, we drew on the
literature from the learning sciences, specifically adult learning theories.
First, we considered learning through lecture. In legal ethics lecture
classes, students are presented with information, either as knowledge
established or developed through hypotheticals. Students may actively
participate in discussing the issues or the hypotheticals and may posit
some behavior they might take as a result while not actually have to do
anything. Students certainly learn from a lecture, and such legal ethics
classes enable students to pass the legal ethics sections of bar exams.
But, if the purpose of professional formation is to launch new lawyers to
practice law well, that means encouraging them to have the necessary
knowledge, skills, and habits.
Here, the lecture pedagogy fails.
Practical wisdom can be learned, but it can only be learned through
experience-a common sense fact strongly supported by research." For
example, Malcolm Knowles' adult learning theory contends that
experience is critical." That theory proposes that adults come to
learning environments with a sense of themselves as self-directed and
motivated to learn those skills related to performing the tasks or roles
they plan to undertake." Adults learn better when they can actively
participate in and reflect on the skills they are seeking to gain."
Although practical wisdom can only be learned through experience, not
all experiences teach wisdom. To learn from experience you must
structure an experience so that you can learn from it. Here, we drew on
some other basic elements of learning theory. First, we embraced
iterative practice with its commitment to acknowledging and harnessing
error. We structured learning so that we, and our students, consistently
revisited experiences through new frames. Further, we made transparent to our students that iterative practice can only be useful if the
practitioner reflects on each iteration. We relied substantially on
mindfulness practices, discussed more fully below, to help us and our

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 1, at 81-106.
See generally KNOWLES, supra note 8, at 86.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 86-87.
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students move into reflection in intentional and transparent ways.86
That reflective practice was heightened by our constant grounding of
discussion in our lived experiences and the lived experiences of our
students. In that way, none of us could become detached from the
endeavor. Thus, our conversations about choices of action remained
deeply personal and helped each of us to feel strongly that our learning
mattered, not only to us but also to our colleagues in class and to the
persons outside of class with whom we were working.
Finally, we did not separate ourselves from our students in the above
processes. We talked about ourselves and our students as one "learning
community." Thus, our structure explicitly embraced the idea that any
of us could be a novice in one moment while being an expert in another.
In that way, we were not permitted to be passive or complacent about
our place in the learning community.
III.

A.

REFINING PRACTICAL WISDOM

Refining the Component Parts of PracticalWisdom

As we thought about our overall definition and framing of practical
wisdom laid out above and as we considered relevant precepts of adult
learning theories, we pressed ourselves to discern the critical process
components of practical wisdom. Had we provided our students only
with a definition of practical wisdom, described to them the end state
characteristics as provided by Kronman or Sternberg, and then
encouraged our students to practice practical wisdom, we would have
little success in cultivating practical wisdom. We knew our students
needed to have some intellectual understanding of practical wisdom, but
we also knew that we had to figure out a process that would lead
students to practice practical wisdom. Thus, we pressed ourselves to
define critical process components of practical wisdom.
We hypothesized that practical wisdom requires one to be competent
in at least three particular actions: empathy, compassion, and relationality (each of which we define and discuss more thoroughly below). We
also hypothesized that each of the three actions, and thus practical

86. We acknowledge the pioneering work of Scott Rogers and Jan Jacobowitz in
bringing mindfulness practices into legal education and into the legal ethics curriculum.
See Jan L. Jacobowitz & Scott Rogers, Mindful Ethics-A Pedagogical and Practical
Approach to Teaching Legal Ethics, Developing Professional Identity, and Encouraging
Civility, 4 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 198 (2014); see also Peter H.
Huang, How Improving Decision-Makingand Mindfulness Can Improve Legal Ethics and
Professionalism,21 J. L. BUS. & ETHICS 35 (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstractid=2474448.
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wisdom as a whole, could be more robustly fostered by mindfulness
practices8 7 and by intentional self-reflection (we talk about the interconnectedness of mindfulness and self-reflection in a moment)." We
were completely transparent with our students that our method of
learning practical wisdom included specific efforts to cultivate their
capacities for empathy, compassion, and relationality, while using
mindfulness techniques and intentional self-reflection in those efforts.
We discerned that empathy was an essential component of practical
wisdom because it allows for a person to be more capaciously aware of
the richness and nuance of the context in which decision-making is
occurring. We worked with a standard notion of empathy-the ability
to perceive and understand another's perspective." We emphasized to
our students that empathy had to be more than trying to predict what
one would do or how one would feel if placed in another's situation. To
put it colloquially, we urged students to move away from the limited
inquiry of "What would I do if I were in X's shoes?" to a more thorough
inquiry of "Have I really listened to, and understood, what X is telling
me she is feeling about the particular situation, without altering X's
story to fit my own interests or experience?"
We emphasized empathy, which truly requires one to stand in
another's shoes, because we do not think wisdom is achievable without
the ability to discern other's perspectives as accurately and nonjudgmentally as possible. Practical wisdom often can lose its "wisdom"
if it comes from a self-centered or self-referential position. When the
frame is limited and is only self-referential, the risk is that what one
believes is wisdom is instead personal judgment based on one's own
limited understanding and interpretation of the specific context.90

87. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and the Legal Profession: An
Introduction to the Mindful Lawyer Symposium, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 634 (2012) (discussing
multiple articles regarding the uses and benefits of mindfulness techniques in legal
education generally).
88. See generallySUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOT S. MILSTEIN & ANN C. SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 23-24

(2014).
89. See, e.g., STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 31 (2009).
90. See NORMAN FISCHER, TRAINING IN COMPASSION: ZEN TEACHINGS ON THE PRACTICE

OF LOJONG 10 (2012). Zen Master Norman Fischer humorously captures the distinction
between taking another's perspective from a self-interested frame and truly taking
another's perspective: "Empathyis the capacity to feel another's feelings. It requires that
we not be so self-absorbed that we're tone-deaf to the experience of others. Most of us,
unfortunately and without realizing it, are living the old joke,'Okay, enough about me; let's
talk about what you think about me.'"
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We also emphasized that empathy need not include feeling an affinity
for, or liking, the other person. Empathy and affinity are different
experiences and require different habits of mind. Affinity means feeling
some sense of positivity towards another." It often can mean feeling
some similarity with another or some sense of shared interests. 9 2
Affinity often does not feel like it is something that one cultivates, but
rather, it is something that is present or is not. In contrast, empathy
can exist (and in our model, must be able to exist) without affinity. A
careful practitioner of empathy notices whatever affinity responses are
made towards another person, positive or negative, and then is able to
empathetically take the other's perspective without that process being
transfigured by affinity.
A final crucial point we clarified about empathy is that it requires
understanding another's perspective, not agreeing with another's
perspective. We were aware of how typical it is to describe a setting in
which we were empathizing with another by using a "but" sentence. For
example, we might recount the following: "I heard Jane say how offended
she was when her boss told her that her work was not as good as a male
colleague's, but I think that . . . ." A "but" sentence masquerades as
empathy because it acknowledges another's perspective. However, it
then immediately moves to a judgment about whether the other's
perspective was right, wrong, accurate, inaccurate, or the like.93
Empathy in that form is like clearing one's throat in anticipation of
making the real statement-the throat clearing is prefatory and
intended to be ignored.
To help students be more aware of whether they were substituting
another's reactions for their own reactions to a situation and when they
were subtly judging instead of empathizing, we used the mindfulness
technique of "noticing."9 4 That technique simply asks a person to notice

91. See Oxford English Dictionary Online, "affinity," www.oed.com/view/Entry/3417?re
directedFrom=affinity#eld (defining "affinity" as "[liking for or attraction to a person or
thing; natural inclination towards something; sympathy and understanding for something;
an instance of this").
92.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 217 (2d ed. 1989).

&

93. Scholars in the field of alternative dispute resolution have described one way to
change this dynamic as "adopting the 'and' stance." DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON
SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO Discuss WHAT MATTERS MOST 39-40,
194-95 (1999) (describing the importance of acknowledging that both perspectives in a
dispute can be "right," and how using the technique of putting the word "and" in place of
words like "but" helps to remind one of the possibility of truthfulness on both sides).
94. For a thorough-going description of a "noticing" practice in a Burmese Theravadan
Buddhist practice, see NYANAPONIKA THERA, THE HEART OF BUDDHIST MEDITATION 89-99

(1996). We followed a similar, but simplified version, of a "noticing" practice in which the
basic instruction was to notice any sensation that arose (physical or mental), and then to
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what sensations-physical, mental, or emotional-arise while a person
is doing any kind of activity, whether sitting in meditation, listening to
another tell a story, arguing a motion to the court, negotiating a deal, or
speaking with a client. For example, when a clinic student is meeting
with a criminal defense client to discuss an offered plea by the prosecutor, and the client is reacting to the plea offer, the student might notice
things such as: "My stomach is growling because I did not have time to
eat lunch before meeting with my client," or "I feel myself getting
irritated at my client because she is talking about something that to me
seems tangential to whether the plea offer is good," or "I find myself
feeling angry with the prosecutor just like my client is angry because my
client and I both agree that the prosecutor is overlooking an important
part of our defense."
The second step of the "noticing" practice, as it relates to cultivating
fulsome empathy, is for the student to quickly reflect whether the
noticed items might have any positive or negative effect on the student's
ability to empathize with another. For example, the clinic student above
might notice that her growling stomach is distracting her from carefully
listening to the client, thereby impinging on the ability to effectively
empathize. In contrast, when the student notices that she and the client
are both angry because they agree that the prosecutor is overlooking a
part of the defense, the student can notice how easy it has become to
empathize with her client. A key feature of a noticing practice (and of
all mindfulness practices) is to notice without judgment." When the
student notices her growling stomach, she just notices it. She resists
making the typical move to judgment. She resists the voice in her head
that says, "That was stupid of me not to eat lunch." Thus, she also
resists being captured by an unreflective and habituated response.96
Noticing practices lead easily into further and deeper self-reflection
about empathy, as well as other facets of practical wisdom. We talked
with our students about noticing and self-reflection as separate practices
that worked best when combined. Often when we ask ourselves or
others to be reflective, we presume that we or they will first be

let the thought go and return one's focus to one's breath. We also began every class
meeting with a short group noticing practice in which we focused on our breathing for a
certain number of breaths. Noticing practices come in many forms, including secular
versions, such as the ones developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn. See generally JON KABAT-ZINN,
WHEREVER YOu Go, THERE You ARE: MINDFULNESS MEDITATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1994).
95. THERA, supra note 94, at 88.
96. See, e.g., Shauna L. Shapiro, Linda E. Carlson, John A. Astin & Benedict Freeman,
Mechanisms of Mindfulness, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 373, 378 (2006) (identifying axioms
of mindfulness and describing "reperceiving" as being able to "observe the contents of
consciousness" without being "completely embedded in or fused with such content").
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conscientious about paying attention to the myriad pieces of information
that will make the reflection useful and fulsome. In fact, however, most
of us rush by that noticing step. We knew from the mindfulness
literature that all of us have developed habits of thought that deeply
influence how we think, and those habits are triggered without us being
aware or noticing the effects of the habits." We fail to include information needed for good reflection and to check assumptions we are making.
Our reflection falls prey to cognitive biases, to time pressure, or to
unacknowledged anxieties and the like. The mindfulness practice of
noticing gives us the tool to interrupt those failures, and ensures that
when we move into reflection, we are doing so with a full complement of
information." We now talk about mindfulness and self-reflection as
"fraternal twins" because they often travel together and are paired up,
but they are not exactly the same.
We also used our discussions and experiences related to empathy as
the doorway for an ongoing conversation about "difference" and how the
experience of being different from another might influence or impede
empathy. The "difference" conversations ensured that we could engage
our students on critical topics including race, gender, poverty, religion,
and ethnic or cultural difference." As we discuss further below, we
always tried to situate our difference conversations within the context
of the students' actual experiences. It was important that students see
the difference conversations and the affinity (or "sameness") conversations as inextricably linked together, with both difference and sameness
producing the risk that we fail to cultivate empathy to the fullness that
is required to produce practical wisdom. Again, noticing practices helped
us to bring the above dynamic into the foreground.

97. See, e.g., id.; see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)
(describing a similar cognitive processing phenomenon of "fast" thinking based on the
habits formed by cognitive heuristics as contrasted to "slow" thinking based on reflection).
98. KAHNEMAN, supra note 97, at 3-4.
99. As we thought about how to set up the difference conversations successfully, we
drew on the rich literature about cultural competency. See generally Susan Bryant, The
Five Habits:Building Cross-CulturalCompetence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the Habits: Teaching About Identity,
Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY (2014). We also specifically considered the
role of implicit bias.
See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness:Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465 (2010). Every student
completed at least two implicit bias surveys from the Project Implicit website, availableat
https://implicit.harvard.edulimplicit/. We conversed with students about how their capacity
for empathy might be influenced by implicit bias without them even being aware of that
influence.

2016]

PRACTICAL WISDOM

351

We defined "compassion," our second component of practical wisdom,
as the ability to perceive the discomfiture of others and to be motivated
to assist the person to improve her situation. 00 We see compassion as
the mechanism by which one makes sure that wisdom becomes more
than an intellectual exercise and, instead, becomes a potentially
transformative action. With empathy alone, one might be content to
perceive the other's experience, reflect on and assess it, but do nothing
more than engage in that process as an intellectual inquiry. Practical
wisdom, however, requires more.
In many ways, compassion is empathy to which one adds a desire to
affect change. Just like we insisted that the kind of empathy required
for practical wisdom must be robust and nuanced, we insisted that the
compassion required for practical wisdom be robust and nuanced as well.
The kind of compassion we hoped to cultivate requires a person to be
motivated to act for reasons other than pity for another. We think of
pity as an essentially self-referential response-"In comparison to you,
I am better (or better off)." We worry that if one acts out of pity, one is
not really taking the perspective of the other or considering actions from
the other's point of view. Instead, one is expressing one's own perspective on the other's situation. Further, compassion should not be a polite
label used to justify arrogance-"I really feel for you and want to help
you out of this situation, but only if we do it my way because I know
better than you do what is best."'o
The robust perspective-taking that we required with empathy plays a
key role in avoiding self-referential and domineering, though wellintentioned, compassionate behavior. If one commits to perceiving
another's experiences, one also can commit to perceiving several
potential options for action, including at least one's own choice and the
other's choice. 0 2 Cultivating compassion may not resolve which choice
of action is best or which choice is worst, but it moves the inquiry from
an abstract one about what is wise to a concrete one about what is the
wise course of conduct given all that one has uncovered about the
context.

100. We defined "compassion" as including the motivation to help another improve her
situation as informed by Buddhist teachings on compassion (or "boddhicitta"). See
FISCHER, supra note 90, at 11-12.
101. We used the mindfulness technique of "noticing" in these settings as well to help

us become more fully aware of the kinds of responses arising and to discern between
compassion, pity, and benign arrogance.
102.

See STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 93, at 39-40.
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The final component of practical wisdom is something we called
"relationality."'os As we have studied practical wisdom and observed
the practice of practical wisdom, we have discerned that the best
decision-makers view context as a dynamic, interconnected web of
relationships. 1 0 4 They configure the setting in terms other than the
dyadic relationship between themselves and the other for whom they feel
empathy and compassion. In our setting, for example, the practicallywise lawyer assesses context not only from the perspective of the lawyerclient relationship, but also from situating himself or herself and the
client within a larger web of relationships (namely, law colleagues, client
colleagues, opposing parties, other interested friendly parties, the court
system, the boardroom, family, or the affected community). Further, the
relevant web of relationships is wide and not bounded by legal concepts
such as plaintiff and defendant, buyer and seller, landlord and tenant,
and the like.
Even if there might be a legal relationship between two people (for
example, a plaintiff versus a defendant in a lawsuit), it may not be the
defining feature of the web of relationships. There could be a more
important relationship between the plaintiff and defendant (for example,
they are business partners), and there could be other connected
relationships for the plaintiff and defendant that are more important
than their relationship to each other (for example, one of the business
partners' spouses is dying of cancer and that partner is more committed
to caring for the spouse than focusing on the business).
We think it important for a lawyer and client to discover the web of
relationships explicitly because it helps to uncover the relevant context
with abundant detail and nuance. An explicit discovery also helps both
the lawyer and the client discover unchecked assumptions they are
making about what the problem is, who in the web is motivated in what
ways, what solutions might be available, and what actions are palatable

103. We settled on the word "relationality" for brevity, even though we use it to mean
a cluster of related issues. For example, relationality can mean the capacity to be sensitive
to the range of relationships that are relevant to a particular situation. Relationality can
also refer to the actual web of relationships. Throughout this Article, we try to be clear in
what sense we are using the word.
104. Again, Norman Fischer captures this sense of interrelatedness nicely when he
notes:
So it becomes almost impossible to be willfully, intentionally aggressive, almost
impossible to be willfully, intentionally disrespectful of others, because we can
simply see with our eyes, just as we can see the sky above and the sun when it
sets, that all of life is one sky warmed by one sun.
FISCHER, supra note 90, at 13.
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or not."o' For example, if the lawyer for the business partner above
with the ill spouse is focused on the legal relationship of business
partner plaintiff versus business partner defendant, and the lawyer
limits her conversations with the business partner to issues related to
the lawsuit, then the lawyer might inappropriately assume the client
also is primarily focused on winning the lawsuit. If the business partner
client is focused on the other business partner's role as the defendant in
a lawsuit, the client might inaccurately assume that the defendant
business partner feels nothing but hostility towards the client because
the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants is supposed to be
adversarial.
Further, we emphasized the image of a web to help our students
visualize the many different pathways and different points of connection
contained in the situation so our students could practice uncovering
context as abundantly as possible. We wanted our students to avoid
putting themselves or a client in the middle of all else that radiated. So
much of the conversation about legal ethics is framed in the dyadic
perspective of the "lawyer-client" relationship.1 0 6 We worry that such
implicit (and maybe explicit) framing reinforces an unscrutinized choice
about the perspectives that matter in decision-making-context is what
the client reports it to be and what the lawyer sees it to be from the
client's viewpoint. Even the modest shift in phrasing from the "lawyerclient" relationship to the "web of relationships" would help our students
better avoid unscrutinized assumptions.
Finally, as with empathy and compassion, we used the noticing
practice to help cultivate relationality and move into thoughtful
reflection about relationality. We asked students to write about, or draw
out, webs of relationships related to their clients or cases. We used a
noticing practice to discern from what vantage points the students
gathered a lot of information (usually their clients' or their own), from
what vantage points they had less information about, and whether the
context looked different in interesting or illuminating ways if different
vantage points of the web of relationships were given priority.
In addition to explicitly discerning what we believed the components
of practical wisdom to be, we also believed practical wisdom cannot truly
develop in fields in which there are multiple normative visions unless a
person first understands to which normative vision she has committed.
As we noted earlier, one never just is practically wise; rather, one always
is practically wise about something. As we discussed earlier, the legal
profession is a field in which there are plural visions about what is the

105.
106.

Pearce & Wald, supra note 69, at 529-31.
Huang, supra note 86.
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appropriate role of the lawyer.o' Each of those visions prioritizes a
certain configuration of what we have called "First Principles." The
First Principles a lawyer prioritizes affect how that lawyer discerns what
is practically wise in a given context.
Consider a lawyer who prioritizes using the law as a mechanism for
large scale social change and who believes that social change is more
important than an individual client personally benefitting from legal
action. When faced with an individual client who now wishes to resolve
the matter for her own personal benefit instead of the original pursuit
of large-scale social benefits, the lawyer might believe the practicallywise choice requires forcefully advocating with the client to maintain the
client's initial commitment to social change. In contrast, if the lawyer
prioritizes individual client autonomy as a First Principle, the lawyer
might believe it is practically wise to resolve the legal matter as quickly
as possible in a way that privileges the client's self-interest.
Further, we strongly believe the Model Rules embrace one normative
vision of the role of the lawyer (the Dominant View) and ignore other
legitimate normative visions (namely, cause lawyering) that prioritize
different First Principles. A lawyer who misperceives the Model Rules
as merely technical guidance is likely to act unreflectingly within the
normative vision of the Dominant View. Nonetheless, the Model Rules
contain many provisions that require a lawyer to exercise discretion or
to interpret the scope and contours of duties or obligations. That
interpretive process is guided necessarily by one's First Principles. The
First Principle of "using law for broad social change" might lead one to
interpret rule application in a particular setting in a different way than
the First Principle of "protecting individual autonomy." Thus, as part
of our process of practicing practical wisdom, we thought it critical that
students explore their own commitments to First Principles before
interpreting, understanding, or applying any of the Model Rules to a
particular context.
As we explored different contexts with our students, our mantra was
the following: Remind yourself about how you prioritize First Principles,
then look to see if there are any Model Rules relevant in the context,
then interpret those rules in light of your First Principles, and then
consider the practically wise choice by using each component of practical
wisdom.
The final process we thought important was our own commitment to
meet the students where they were situated. We understood the
importance of starting from a student's own experiences and vantage
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See supra notes 42, 53, 62, 69 and accompanying text.
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points because a student knows her own stories so well and because a
student is likely to be highly invested in her own stories and in the
resulting behavior and decision-making. We thought those features
would make starting a conversation about judgment, ethics, and wisdom
more accessible and comfortable.
We regularly supplemented our
students' stories with narratives from other lawyers, but we tried to
never work only from those outside narratives. Similarly, we posited
hypotheticals in response to students' own stories, instead of relying on
outside hypotheticals.
Further, as we built conversations with our students, we committed
to framing the discussions in ways that would trigger "aha" moments,
not "gotcha" moments.
We wanted students to feel comfortable
disclosing their mistakes or whether, after reflection, they would have
done things differently. To foster "aha" moments, we often translated
the mindfulness noticing technique into questions we posed to students.
While the noticing was happening after the fact, it helped us to prompt
reflective judgment in our students rather than imposing our own
judgments on them.
B.

Refining a Pedagogy About PracticalWisdom

How did we build these processes into the actual class structure, and
what did we observe and experience in the class? We chose to start with
the lived experience of our students-their own stories of problems they
faced, choices they made, emotions they felt, and their successes or
regrets. We had two hypotheses. One was that the best way to learn
competencies and habits-the essence of practical wisdom-is by actively
grappling with problem-solving and choice-making.
The second
hypothesis was that situation-based learning is best internalized for
future application if the problem is one the student has personally
experienced. "Professional practice," as William Sullivan et al. noted, is
"judgment in action."'o A student both knows and is highly invested
in her own stories and in her resulting behavior and decision-making.
Thus, personally-experienced stories offer the potential to be the richest
sources of learning.'
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SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
109. Legal scholars and educators have long embraced the use of narrative as a potent
teaching tool. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case
Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000) (reviewing
literature specifically about narrative theory and legal ethics). For the use of narratives
in the law more generally, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreward:Telling Stories, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2073 (1989).
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We taught the class twice.no The first time, we structured the class
so it would be a small, seminar size. The next time, the class was sized
the same as other sections of the required legal ethics course and was
capped at forty-five students. We offered the seminar course to students
who had taken, or were taking, a clinic."' Each enrolled student had
experience in one of the clinics that provided legal representation for
individual clients (as opposed to working in one of the clinics in which
entities are represented). For the larger class, we advised students to
enroll only if they felt they had sufficient legal experience to draw on to
fully engage with the narrative assignments throughout the semester.112
We based all the sessions on the stories we asked the students to bring
to class about a personal lawyering experience. These were not stories
about "the theory of the case" or the technical details of a transaction.
Instead, the stories focused on how the students experienced their legal
matter-the choices they made or might have made, their feelings and
emotions, and the conundrums they experienced. The stories provided
us with the "raw material," which we mined in class discussion to
consider what problem-solving might look like when informed with
practical wisdom. Importantly, the raw material included descriptions
of the student and the relationships with a client, possibly the client's
family, other parties, the decision-makers (judges, bosses, board chairs),
the witnesses, and the broader justice system and society. We asked
students to use techniques of reflectiveness and mindfulness when they
wrote and talked about their stories, and we modeled and practiced
those techniques in class.
We helped students by providing them with frameworks, theories,
tools, readings, or outside narratives that encouraged them to imagine
and consider alternative ways they could have handled their own

110. The first time we taught the class, Ken was on sabbatical from Swarthmore and
he was able to be in Boulder to physically co-teach the first third of class. When he
returned to the east coast, he and Deborah set up regular phone calls to talk about how
class was proceeding the rest of the semester and to keep him abreast of the students'
stories. Deborah then taught the class the second time on her own. Ken and she
continued to speak regularly by phone or e-mail.
111. Colorado Law has nine clinics. Six of the clinics focus on representing individual
clients in various substantive law areas, including criminal defense, family law, and
immigration. Another clinic handles environmental advocacy, generally on behalf of nonprofit entity clients. One clinic focuses on business formation and handles no litigation.
The final clinic pursues policy work on technology issues.
112. Students in the larger class had a mix of summer work experiences, externship
experience, and clinic experience. Roughly a third of those students worked with or for
entities, both private and governmental. The other two-thirds of the students primarily
had experience with individual clients.
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experience. The students then had a chance to "practice again" when
they returned to their work settings (such as clinics or externships).
Both classes met twice a week for ninety minutes each class. Students
in both classes completed the same number of written narrative
assignments. Specifically, during the first four weeks of the class, every
student wrote a narrative based on reflective prompts we provided,
which related to that week's theme."1
We read all of the narratives
before the first class meeting of the week. Then, in the first class, each
student randomly exchanged narratives with a classmate. Each student
in a pair then provided their colleague with reflective comments about
the other's narrative by the second class. We read all of those comments
as well.1 14 After the initial four weeks, students still brought their
own stories into class, but we shared those stories orally.
We designed weekly themes to help the students focus their stories
and the discussion. These themes and our follow-up questions were
designed to prompt students to learn the core habits and skills of
practical wisdom-empathy, compassion, and relationality-all of which
were encouraged and buttressed through the processes of mindfulness
and self-reflection. The prompts for written assignments typically
started with "tell us a story about" one of the following: the best
experience you have had as a student attorney with one of your clients,
what you think this experience was like for your client, a matter that
involved a constellation of people in addition to the client (family
members, business partners, other professionals), how you and your
client have determined who makes decisions in your case, a time that
you disagreed with a client, about a client or a project that you really
believed in, and a client you did not believe in.
In much of law school, students are asked to write about the law from
a removed perspective, which risks making people ancillary. However,
much of actual lawyering and lawyerly writing is about effective
storytelling (to a court, to a board of directors, to a government agency).

113. When Deborah taught the larger class, she provided everyone with technical
guidance on a lawyer's duty of confidentiality to ensure that students wrote narratives in
ways that would not violate the Model Rules, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6,
and could be shared with everyone in class. Since Deborah read the narratives before
students exchanged them in class, she was able to make sure that students were making
good judgments about preserving confidential information. Deborah was worried that
preserving confidentiality in the larger class might be more challenging than it proved to
be.
114. The students used those weekly narratives and comments as initial material for
a final, longer narrative paper in which they expanded their stories, deepened their selfreflection, and came to some conclusions about the normative role and First Principles they
hoped they were committing to.
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In building the class around actual stories, we not only helped the
students learn how to tell and analyze stories, but we used the
narratives and discussion to encourage students to notice and reflect on
crucial things that enable good judgment: to locate themselves as an
actor in a web of relationships, to empathize with different characters,
to listen carefully, to discern nuance in different personalities, to handle
ethical dilemmas, and to imagine alternative stories and outcomes.
Reflectiveness and mindfulness were not so much prompts but
practices, encouraged by the very structure of the class discussions and
the nature of our facilitation. For example, we typically asked students
questions such as the following: What did you notice then and what do
you notice now? What were you thinking? How did you feel? How did
you handle your feelings? What other ways might you have handled
them? What choices were not taken? We were not only drawing on
their ongoing practical experience as student attorneys but also
encouraging them to practice the practiceof ethics so the habit and skills
of reflectiveness or mindfulness would be learned, would become part of
their repertoire, and would become a part of them. By inculcating
reflection and mindfulness, we aimed for the students to connect their
choices and actions to the end goal, the telos, of their roles as lawyers
and to become clear about the range of normative end goals from which
they could choose.
Reflection and mindfulness-like empathy, compassion, and a
sensitivity to relationality-do not always "happen" by getting students
to simply tell their stories. The students needed to learn how to reflect
upon them and how to learn from these reflections. Such learning might
(and did) include the following: learning through analogy to other
student cases or other cases in the literature-noticing what the
similarities and differences were; getting guidance from other cases,
from principles, and guidelines like the Model Rules; and learning to
challenge or interpret the usefulness of the Model Rules in the context
of any particular case. We also encouraged students to learn to imagine
how they might act in the future.
The format for reflecting on experience in the class always involved
writing or telling stories, sharing the writing or telling the stories in
class, and then discussing the stories. To help focus this process, we
provided a rough scaffold for them. We did not, however, rigorously
stick to this order or have a check-list requirement regarding how each
paper or discussion needed to progress through the stages. However, the
guideline and scaffold generally looked like this: Tell us a story from
your work with a client that illustrates this kind of experience.
(Experiences sometimes were points of challenge, sometimes points of
connection.) Explain the choice you made and how and why you made
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it. Explain how you felt about it and how you think your client or other
relevant actors felt about it. Think broadly about whom the "relevant
actors" could be. Now, identify what First Principles were underneath
this choice. What were you aiming at? What does that say about the
kind of lawyering role you are committing to? Now look at the Model
Rules. How useful were they? What choices would you have had to
make to interpret the rule(s) and justify your actions? Would you have
countermanded your actions? Looking back on this story, how does
understanding your choice, your feelings, the First Principles, and the
possible relevant Model Rules help you think about the lawyering role
you chose? Would you make another choice if faced with that situation
again? Why? Starting with students' lived experiences meant that the
discussion in the class would not be linear. The first task was to get
students to talk about their experiences and their choices. The second
step was to help them bring out-to uncover or discover-the kind of
lawyering role and the telos or aim that undergirded their practice. Our
aim here was to encourage reflection and self-awareness. We did not
want students to stop at the step where they just identified the aim
implicit in their story. We pushed them to use mindfulness and selfreflection to deeply engage their choices, yet also to be curious about
what might have happened had they made other choices animated by
other normative end goals.
Some of these discussions affirmed the students' choices and (hopefully) empowered them to choose more intentionally in the future. At
times, the discussions caused the students to reflect on and change the
kind of aim and the kind of lawyering they were doing-or planned on
doing. It would not be surprising if, over the arc of their careers, this
kind of reflection and change happened a number of times. (In fact, we
firmly hope that this will occur.) As we noted earlier, the discussions
were not meant to be a "gotcha" moment as in "look, look, see the wrong
thing that you are really doing." Instead, the conversations were
designed to encourage an "aha" moment-"Oh, yes, I now see what I am
aiming at. I am going to give myself and others an account of it. I will
try to describe it, defend it, wonder about it, and reconsider it."
In discussing the issues, we gently, but adamantly and continuously,
encouraged the students to notice what ethical issues were involved in
the experience they were recounting. Our aim was not to focus on
identifying the technical ethical issue-"Oh, maybe I did not meet the
communication standard set out in Model Rule 1.4"-although we did
attend to those kinds of questions. Rather it was to illuminate that
every moment, every experience, was infused with an ethical dimension
that they needed to be mindful about. We needed students to understand that whether and how they assessed if there was "an ethical issue"

360

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

and whether they saw that ethical issue as small and easy, big and
hard, or uncontested and contested inextricably was tied to how they
exercised the core competencies of practical wisdom situated within their
commitment to one of the normative roles of lawyering. The students'
stories naturally proved that similar experiences can be understood and
Since the students respected each other, they
viewed differently.
embraced our efforts to use class discussion as a practice space for
reconsidering the ethical components of the stories using empathy,
compassion, and relationality, and situating those competencies in each
of the normative views of lawyering. By using class discussion to
practice practical wisdom, our own telos was to confirm that practical
wisdom is not an innate trait, but a good mental habit that can be
learned and improved upon.
Thus far, we have focused on describing our hypotheses regarding
practical wisdom and our design for implementing the practice of
practical wisdom. We now consider whether our hypotheses and
practices proved useful by exploring a handful of stories that came out
of our students' writings and class discussions.
IV

THE STORIES

As we described above, the raw materials for each class were the
stories students wrote or told about their experiences as lawyers. We
revisited stories regularly, and the students updated the class on their
work. At the end of the semester, students wrote a final, more in-depth
reflection paper in which they considered whether and how they had
developed practical wisdom. By the end of our time with these
particular learning communities, we had a wealth of material we could
reflect back on to consider whether our efforts made a difference in
helping students better their competency in practical wisdom. Here are
some examples of students practicing practical wisdom."'
A.

Phil, Joe, and Barbara

Joe was set up to have a bad experience with his student attorney,
Phil, the moment Phil first walked through the door. Joe had been in
jail for thirty days when he first met Phil. He was charged with
domestic violence (DV) for hitting his girlfriend while they were both

115. Throughout the narratives, we have anonymized people, places, and details to
preserve confidential information as required by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6. We
provided confirming source materials to the editors of Mercer Law Review for our Article
to be properly checked. However, to preserve confidentiality, those materials are not
publicly available.
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drunk and with keeping her from getting away from him. Joe could not
raise the $500 bail to get out of jail and needed an attorney to help him
reach a plea or to defend him in court. Joe's previous experiences with
lawyers prepared him not to trust his student attorney.
Phil immediately noticed that Joe did not open up. When Phil read
the police reports, "Joe just kept saying he was drunk and didn't
remember anything in a way that suggested that he just didn't want to
talk about it." Phil also noticed how despondent Joe was: alone, with no
one to turn to for bail money-the letters Phil had brought to jail for Joe
and which Joe had hoped contained bail money totaled only $50. Phil
also noticed how savvy Joe was about the system. Phil explained that
the District Attorney (DA) offered six to nine months of jail time or
twelve months of probation, and Joe was quickly willing to bargain. He
would take three to six months of jail or six to nine months of probation.
Phil felt that crafting the right plea for Joe demanded earning Joe's
trust:
Every time we ended a meeting I told Joe when I would be back,
whether or not I accomplished what I had set out to do, and then I
kept those appointments .... Even going back and telling him I didn't
have much news to report because I had not heard back from the DA
or had been unable to contact witnesses showed him that I respected
him enough to keep my word even if from a practical standpoint it
wasn't really necessary. Just the fact that I was there when I said I
was going to be showed him that he was respected and not forgotten
about while in jail.
In our meetings I was always very upfront about things I didn't know,
and I think this also helped me gain credibility. One time [Joe] asked
me what would happen if he made bail then did not show up for the
hearing and I didn't know. I wasn't sure if failing to appear was
violating a court order that could be its own separate charge like
violating a protection order, or if it wasn't then what other penalties
would be involved. I told him I didn't know, but I wrote it down in
front of him, told him I'd ask my supervising attorney and would have
the answer for him the next time I was back . . .. I think being very
willing to show my inexperience gave credibility to the things I said I
was certain about and made him feel he could trust his attorney.
That trust turned out to be important. Joe seemed to favor trial (he
was certain his girlfriend would not show up) or probation. Phil nudged

him away from the trial, pointing out the maximum sentence if his
girlfriend did appear. Then, he nudged Joe away from probation: "My
primary goal was to get him out of jail; and the secondary goal was to
do it without probation because if he got probation, he would probably
flee the state." When Phil nudged Joe to take the plea, Joe trusted his
advice. Because of the two months Joe already served in jail, in the best
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case scenario, he would be released a month before Thanksgiving; in the
worst case, it would be after Christmas.
By the end of the process, after Phil's five visits with Joe in jail, Phil
had built more than trust.
I got to feel sympathy, compassion, and excitement for [Joe] despite the
fact that I think he probably did hit his girlfriend . . . . I was a little
apprehensive about how I'd feel about representing DV [domestic
violence] clients, but Joe showed me that despite this one bad act I
could still feel positive emotions toward him.
They were both pleased when the judge sentenced Joe to three months.
Joe was released that same day after having already spent that amount
of time in jail.
With Joe, Phil began to reflect on what it meant for him as a lawyer
to like a client and to contrast that feeling with empathy. In many
ways, Phil's starting efforts were self-focused--ensuring Joe trusted him
by keeping all his meetings with Joe and being honest with Joe about
legal questions he did or did not know how to answer. As Phil's
relationship with Joe grew, Phil had to expand his reflection to consider,
not just how Joe saw him, but how he saw Joe and whether Joe was
more nuanced and complicated than merely being a DV "offender." Phil
also began to realize he had unconsciously adopted a starting normative
view of a lawyer as a paternalistic Dominant View lawyer. One of the
unstated reasons that Phil wanted Joe to trust him was that Phil
thought he knew what Joe's best choice was (nudging Joe away from
trial). Phil wanted to convince Joe to go along with Phil's advice.
However, as their relationship grew and as we explicitly discussed
normative lawyering roles in class, Phil became aware of, and uncomfortable with, his paternalism. Phil genuinely wanted to engage with his
clients, and he wanted to be able to speak his mind with them while not
dominating them. He then began to explicitly plan his actions so that
they would be consonant with his developing telos of lawyering-a telos
that Phil could not yet fully identify or describe but that strongly
rejected certain arrogant behaviors popularly associated with lawyering.
Unlike his experience with Joe, Phil initially could not feel either
affinity or empathy for his client Barbara. She never even showed up
to meet Phil. Still, he represented her with diligence and competence.
What motivated him, and did his work require practical wisdom?
At 2:30 a.m., Barbara drove into a rotary, smashing her SUV. She
was saved by her airbag and a nearby policeman who helped her out of
the vehicle. All signs pointed to her being drunk: no skid marks (she
apparently had not even tried to hit the brakes); the officer smelled
alcohol on her breath; and there was a blood alcohol test over the legal
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limit. When Phil was assigned the case, he sought out Barbara and, not
finding her, he diligently tried to track her down:
I called the phone numbers we had for her, I sent her letters, but they
all got me nowhere. I even tracked down her mail [carrier] who
confirmed that the address we had was only a summer home with no
mailbox .

..

.

We continued the case [in court] until we couldn't

anymore and then we just started to litigate it without her. Our only
chance of winning at trial would be to keep the blood test out, and even
then we were likely to lose....
But Phil pressed on trying to build a case without her. The lynch pin
was convincing the judge to preclude the blood alcohol results based on
shoddy lab work. Phil spent days preparing his argument.
An
investigative report about the lab showed so many procedural errors that
the lab was forced to close (and the director had resigned). Phil
prepared to cross-examine the lab technician who had done the tests.
However, on the "day of the hearing, Barbara didn't show so a warrant
was issued for her arrest." "Normally," said Phil, "I find a tremendous
amount of motivation from getting to know my clients, their families,
and their problems." But, when it came to Barbara:
I felt no compassion reading about her situation in the police reports
I felt almost no duty whatsoever for Barbara herself ... never
having met her she was just another drunk driver that could have
killed someone. I don't have much sympathy for drunk drivers
generally, and I didn't really care if she was arrested, convicted,
whatever. For the first half of our relationship, I began to outright
resent her . ...
What was so frustrating for me, and made me feel a
bitter indignation at having been treated unfairly, was that if I had
been able to get in touch with Barbara, we would have just settled the
case because there was very little chance of winning her case at trial.
In retrospect its crazy to blame someone for treating me unfairly, when
they don't even know who I am. Regardless, I had to actively combat
my apathy on her case by finding [a different] motivation. . . or else I
would have done a crappy job at the hearings.
As with his initial work with Joe, Phil initially moved forward on
Barbara's case motivated by his own need to be seen as competent.
While Phil went through the experience, he started to consider what
telos is being served by criminal defense attorneys. Phil's reflection
caused him to decide to make Barbara's case about two other things.
First, to hold the prosecutors to a high standard. Because "we love to
incarcerate people in this country like no other in the world, I wanted
to make sure the jailors jump through the proper hoops to do it." Phil
knew he would lose "but god dammit I wasn't going to give them an inch
they didn't earn. If this blood test was going to come in then it would

364

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

be over my kicking and screaming." Second, Phil stepped into his role
as a criminal defense attorney, and, as he said:
I made it about pride. I felt I had a duty to myself to represent myself
as professionally as possible in front of the [Attorney General (AG)],
the DA, and the judge. Just because I was an inexperienced student
it didn't mean I was going to be a pushover even if it was the AG at
the other table . . .. I also felt I had to represent myself and my cohort
well out of respect for the court if not the system.
Phil eventually did meet Barbara. She called him a few months later
after she was picked up for driving under restraint. They exchanged
over eighty emails and he met her once-in court. Barbara took a plea.
Phil then filed a number of complicated motions trying to get her license
back. He got to know her "decently well". "We've been through highs
and lows together and she gave a heartfelt and sincere sentencing
argument herself when she accepted her plea .... After so much time
with Barbara, the dial has certainly moved from mild resentment to
perhaps as far as mild compassion."
We did not explicitly prompt Phil to talk about trust or tell us why
trust was critical to being a competent or diligent lawyer. However, in
telling his stories, Phil often reflected on the importance of building
trust with Joe and, implicitly, on his own distrust of Barbara. We ran
with it (though it was not "scheduled" on the syllabus) and that enabled
the class to grapple with the issue concretely-to "discover" it as a
potentially crucial issue of professional formation and to feel its
importance in their own daily practice. In turn, that opened up a much
tougher practical wisdom question of how cultivating empathy and
compassion can result in gaining trust. The practical know-how to
cultivate empathy and compassion is hard to learn unless it comes from
experience and reflection. Phil initially articulated his struggle as one
about competency. It was easy to be competent for Joe because Joe
opened up and listened to Phil, but it was hard to learn to be competent
for Barbara because she was absent for so long. Phil struggled with this
issue.
As Phil talked about his experiences and class members reflected back
to him, he noticed the difference between empathy and compassion in
very concrete situations and considered how both were different from
affinity. That, then, raised another critical practical wisdom question:
what do you do-what motivates you-when feelings of antipathy are
highly salient? In that regard, Barbara's case seemed like a brick wall
that Phil ran into. In reflecting on how he pressed on, Phil drew upon
broader normative motivations to cultivate empathy and compassion,
including his desire to hold the prosecutors feet to the fire in a justice
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system that is overcommitted to incarceration, especially of those
without resources like Joe and Barbara.
What also struck us-because it was something we had been aiming
for and encouraging with the stories and class discussions-was Phil's
growing capacity to reflect on where his feelings were coming from (selfunderstanding) and what he could actively do to educate his emotions.
In his final essay, which was open ended with no specific prompts from
us, Phil chose to focus on understanding what compassion was for him,
why he did or did not feel it, and what he could do about it. Phil
observed that personally knowing a client helped him cultivate empathy
and compassion. As he said, the more "involved and present a client is
in her interactions with me" the more it will "directly impact my level
of compassion." With Joe (and a second client who was also in jail), Phil
stated the following:
I shared much more in their human experience. I saw the food they
ate. I smelled the jail they lived in. I followed orders from the same
guards they did. I saw the rooms they spent 23 hours a day in ....
With both [people] I made the decision that they should feel taken care
of by their attorney, so I visited them even when it was not technically
necessary.... [Tihe legal issues were fairly easy and straightforward.
They both had done what they were accused of doing, so my job was to
negotiate as good of a plea as I could. And I did. I know I felt
compassion for them because I was also motivated to alleviate their
suffering that came from being alone.
Phil reflected "that if Barbara and I had emailed half as much but had
met in person 2 - 4 more times I would have felt much more compassion
for her." Recognizing that, Phil said, "can help me push clients to meet
up with me in person if we have the option."
Phil also reflected on the way that race mattered for him when it came
to compassion. "I myself am half Mexican and I speak Mexican Spanish.
I can't help, or perhaps I don't want to help, that I feel a special
connection with Mexican Spanish speakers which inherently makes me
feel compassionate toward them." So, he concluded, he needed to be
mindful of "how much these non-Hispanic distinctions affect my
compassion" and to "try to monitor this going forward and take steps
accordingly." What kind of steps?
Phil identified some very concrete goals. First, he wanted to have at
least three to four personal encounters with clients. Second, he wanted
to overcome the resentment that can come when a client is less helpful
or less engaged. From the beginning, Phil said: "[I want to] frame our
relationship as one where I am there to assist in his or her own defense,
but am not there to fix a client's problem, [because] then I believe clients
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will take more responsibility in their cases." The third goal was the
following:
If I notice that I'm in danger of feeling resentful toward a client I can
take affirmative steps to increase my compassion toward him. I have
been doing compassion building meditations lately where I first
envision a friend I respect and love, and cultivate compassion toward
him. Then I do the same with someone I feel neutral about, then
someone who is difficult or an enemy. Then I try to picture all three
of them around me and hold equal compassion toward each. I have
had great success with this recently and have been able to cultivate
compassion toward the few people I have despised or hated for years.
If I have a difficult client I can take 20 minutes and put them in the
difficult spot [i.e., placing the person in the spot where one specifically
cultivates compassion for an "enemy"] I have faith this will make a
tangible difference.

B.

Maureen, Mr. Moss, and Mr. 'uttle

Maureen was not eager to focus on the call of our opening assignment,
which was to discuss her best experience with a client, why she felt she
was a "good" lawyer throughout the experience, and to describe her
client's perspective about that experience. The extreme nervousness she
felt about her ability to serve her clients made her reframe our questions
as asking her to speak about "competency." More particularly, Maureen
was worried that the Model Rules required her to be competent, and she
did not want to violate that ethical command. From our perspective, we
needed to meet Maureen at her starting point-a worry about competency-while encouraging her to see that she could not possibly answer her
own question until she could first answer the question of "competent for

what aim, or for what purpose, or for what telos?"
In ways similar to Phil, Maureen's concerns about her competency
were deeply connected to questions of motivation: she was nervous
enough about being competent with Mr. Moss with whom she felt a great
affinity, but she was even more concerned about being competent with
Mr. Tuttle, for whom she felt antipathy. Maureen told us the following
even before her first meeting with Mr. Moss at a bond hearing in a
misdemeanor case:
I was nervous about a potential language barrier. I was nervous about
having to deliver the news that, because of [an immigration detainer],
Mr. Moss would be immediately transferred to the immigration
detention facility after his criminal bond was paid - if it was paid. I
was nervous to share that, regardless of his bond amount in the
criminal case, Mr. Moss and his family should be prepared to pay a
much higher amount in immigration court. I was nervous about giving
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the client bad legal advice. I was nervous about not fully understanding how Mr. Moss' criminal charges would affect his immigration case.
After interviewing Mr. Moss, Maureen knew that she would need more
time to collect the evidence needed to persuade the judge to lower Mr.
Moss' bond amount. That meant convincing Mr. Moss to agree that she
could ask the judge to continue the bond hearing. When Mr. Moss
agreed, Maureen was so grateful that she "set out on a one-woman
mission to do everything [she] could to help Mr. Moss."
Maureen wrote and spoke in class about how much she was motivated
in her mission by her affinity for Mr. Moss and his family. Maureen
spent numerous hours collecting medical records regarding Mr. Moss'
youngest daughter to buttress arguments that Mr. Moss would not leave
the country given his daughter's serious illness. She made unannounced
visits to witnesses to seek their statements in support of Mr. Moss. She
noted how powerful it was for her to meet Mr. Moss' gravely-ill
daughter, to hear Mr. Moss talk about his family, and to observe how his
worries and concerns played across his face. These small encounters
stayed with Maureen and were potent. She recalled how Mr. Moss' "face
lit up when I talked about his youngest daughter and her newest nail
polish color." She described her affinity as "'Tu lucha es mi lucha.' Your
struggle is my struggle."
Maureen's deep personal affinity for Mr. Moss and his family
motivated her to act in spite of her nervousness and to learn quickly as
much as she could to acquire the competence she needed. This deep
affinity also had its challenges. She stated, "I felt more stress, and lost
more sleep, over Mr. Moss' case than I did with any other client."
Maureen also felt personally responsible for the outcome of Mr. Moss'
cases in ways that she did not for other clients. She speculated that she
felt such responsibility because she thought Mr. Moss was a good person,
because she was dismayed at the harshness of the immigration system,
and because she was distressed that a family might be separated with
tragic results.
Maureen overcame her nervousness with the help of feelings of affinity
in the case of Mr. Moss, but such motivation left her in a difficult
position with Mr. Tuttle. From the start Maureen's relationship with
Mr. Tuttle was rocky. He did not return her phone calls. He showed up
at his criminal pre-trial conference early and told the court that
Maureen was his attorney, but that he did not know why she was not
there. Mr. Tuttle was gone when Maureen arrived at court at the
prescribed time, and she learned from others that he had gone ahead
with the pre-trial conference without her, complaining about her
absence. When Mr. Tuttle finally came to a meeting with Maureen, he
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arrived late and high. From the start, Maureen felt disrespected by Mr.
Tuttle and was offended by his behavior.
If it were not enough that Maureen found Mr. Tuttle personally
challenging, she also did not find his legal case compelling. He was
involved in a ruckus at a local dive bar and arrested. Throughout the
criminal case, Mr. Tuttle insisted that he should not have been arrested,
arguing at times that he was racially profiled and at other times that
the police were "The Man" and were out to get average guys like him. As
Maureen described it, "My impression was that Mr. Tuttle felt wronged
by just about everyone in existence, but that he believed that he could
do no wrong himself."
Maureen worried she would not be competent for Mr. Tuttle because
she did not like him. Maureen put it as, "[S]uffice it to say that
Mr. Tuttle has never been my favorite client." As Maureen noticed her
feelings, she described how she consciously made herself do extra work
on Mr. Tuttle's case to make sure she was being a competent lawyer.
She even took some actions based on Mr. Tuttle's requests, not because
she thought those actions would be helpful to his case, but because she
did not want Mr. Tuttle to say she was unwilling to help him due to her
ill-feelings. But to do this work, Maureen had to "psych herself up."
At first, Maureen looked to an abstract notion of "competency" to find
something to motivate her in spite of her antipathy. Maureen talked
about needing to be competent because she wanted to make sure she
protected her own professional reputation and the reputation of her
clinic, and because she knew part of her grade for the clinic would be
based on her work for Mr. Tuttle. Maureen chastised herself for being
worried about her grade.
The initial question we framed for Maureen and the class was what
did it mean to them to be a good person and a good lawyer? We did not
expect Maureen (and other students) to implicitly translate the question
into one of being a competent lawyer. Nonetheless, that unexpected turn
gave us a terrific way to start investigating differences between practical
wisdom and technical lawyering prowess. Initially, Maureen saw
competency as synonymous with paying attention to the technical side
of the representation (namely, gathering evidence, interviewing
witnesses, preparing for court hearings, and the like). To Maureen,
competency did not include paying attention to her own reactions or
emotions. It did not include understanding what normative role she
believed a lawyer should play in our society. Nor did Maureen see
competent lawyering as including her own assessment of what she
thought was a fair or just outcome in her clients' cases. When she
discussed fairness and justice, they were part of her explanation of why
she did or did not feel affinity.
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However, in response to our prompts about what client experiences
made her feel good about herself and what experiences she thought were
the most salient to the client, Maureen included her sense of personal
connection with Mr. Moss (and lack of it with Mr. Tuttle) and her own
judgment about whether the legal system was treating the clients justly
(it was being just to Mr. Tuttle and unjust to Mr. Moss). Those
responses opened the door for a larger normative conversation: was it
appropriate for a lawyer to seek to achieve a bigger aim of justice, even
if being technically competent in a case did not require seeking that
bigger aim? Further, if seeking justice was an appropriate goal for a
lawyer, then whose vision of justice should be used-the lawyer's, the
client's, or someone else's? Working with Mr. Moss and Mr. Tuttle got
Maureen thinking about how she wanted to be more than just a cog in
the legal system-more than just technically competent. She started to
think through the First Principles and, thus, what normative lawyering
role she would adopt to guide her towards just results.
Maureen's stories also allowed us to continue introducing students to
two of the critical components of practical wisdom, empathy and
compassion. For example, even from the beginning, Maureen had a
nascent sense that she would find lawyering fraught in the long term if
she only was satisfied working with clients for whom she felt an affinity.
However, she was extraordinarily honest and open about experiencing
profoundly different senses of affinity between Mr. Moss and Mr. Tuttle.
Bolstered by our noticing practice, Maureen's openness provided us
with an easy opportunity to investigate her experiences of affinity and
empathy and to work through how the two are different. We found it
important to spend time in class talking through what empathy actually
looked like (or could look like) with particular clients like Mr. Tuttle.
The students needed to have some reflective space to talk through what
it actually felt like to take a client's perspective while not agreeing with
it, including how to engage a client in an active, yet non-judgmental,
conversation about perspectives.
For example, Maureen described trying to talk with Mr. Tuttle about
the options available to resolve his criminal case. Mr. Tuttle was
adamant that the criminal case should be dismissed and that the police
and prosecutor unfairly targeted him. If Maureen had to rely on feeling
an affinity with Mr. Tuttle to understand his perspective, she knew she
would never be able to place herself in his shoes; thus, she needed to
find a different way to understand his perspective. As she practiced
replacing affinity with empathy, she and the other students came to
experience, not just intellectually understand, that empathy did not
mean agreement-it was a kind of perspective-taking. Maureen could
see how people may feel disempowered in our society and could see how
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law enforcement wielded power in harsh and punitive ways. From there,
while it was still challenging for her to take Mr. Tuttle's perspective,
Maureen felt the prospect of getting to his perspective was at least
possible.
Because every student had some similar set of experiences, those
shared stories formed the basis for rich class conversations about why
empathy was more useful than affinity in cultivating practical wisdom.
Those stories and the noticing mindfulness practice also prompted
thoughtful discussions about why lawyers always will feel various levels
of affinity across clients. However, that descriptive fact need not become
overwhelmingly potent, as long as an attorney is also able to cultivate
empathy towards every client.
Because one of the key features of empathy is being able to take
multiple perspectives and not just one's own or that of the client,
empathy also became a vehicle for expanding the possibilities for
students to feel compassion for their clients. In settings like the one
between Maureen and Mr. Moss, such feelings were easy. She watched
the pain on Mr. Moss' face when he talked about how worried he was
about his family making it while he was in jail. She noticed similar
expressions of concern on the faces of his family members. She also
strongly believed that Mr. Moss was being treated unfairly. As she said,
"[Tihe judicial system that I so believed in was failing me" when the
judge refused to lower the amount of Mr. Moss' bond, and she "took
personal offense that the great, American judicial system - whose
merits [she] so deeply believed in - would allow this to happen." Thus,
taking her own and her client's perspectives generated more than
enough motivation in Maureen for her to help Mr. Moss.
In contrast with Mr. Tuttle, when Maureen took her own perspective,
and even when she took Mr. Tuttle's perspective that he was being
persecuted by the police, those perspectives only weakly cultivated
compassion and motivation to help Mr. Tuttle. However, as Maureen
considered other normative perspectives such as her role as a criminal
defense attorney vis-d-vis the state and its powerful prosecutorial
authority, her role as a student attorney in a clinic dedicated to
providing free legal services to the poor, or the perspectives of friends
and family of Mr. Tuttle who worried about him going to jail, those
perspectives helped her cultivate a stronger compassion towards Mr.
Tuttle. It was easier for Maureen to feel compassion for Mr. Tuttle
when she situated him within her developing normative role view and
considered how he was just like all of the defendants in the criminal
system who need an attorney that can push back against the state's
prosecutorial power. It was easier for Maureen to feel compassion for
Mr. Tuttle once she became clear about her normative vision for the role
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of the lawyer and once she saw Mr. Tuttle as a critical piece of the social
justice mission of her clinic.
One of the interesting developments we observed was the qualitative
difference between the motivation students showed through compassion
versus the motivation students showed through obligation. When
Maureen first wrote about why she worked hard for Mr. Tuttle, she
She was
relied on language like "duty-bound" and "obligation."
forthright that she begrudged Mr. Tuttle at times and that at times she
was motivated to do her work to protect her grade in the clinic, not to
protect Mr. Tuttle. As her work continued and as she contemplated
empathy and compassion, she changed her language and began to talk
about her "motivations to do the work" and how she could tolerate
difficult clients, be motivated to work for them, and be motivated by
something other than her personal connection with a client, including
her commitment to the clinic's mission.
The "motivation" dialogue also proved to be a perfect entry into
conversations about First Principles and the role of a lawyer. For
example, Maureen initially planned her actions for both Mr. Moss and
Mr. Tuttle mostly based on what she determined would constitute
"competent" lawyering (or what she determined would be good after
consulting with her supervising attorney). She also described her
lawyerly role consistently with the Dominant View of lawyering. She
was "duty-bound" to help only her client and helping her client meant
following the client's instructions as consciously as possible without
Almost immediately,
interfering in the client's decision making.
Maureen realized she was doing more for Mr. Moss compared to the rest
of her clients. And, she experienced that she had to push herself to do
enough for Mr. Tuttle. Thus, she noticed that even if she wanted to take
the Dominant View's role of being a fulsome agent for her clients, she
still faced many choices and decisions about what being a fulsome agent
actually looked like in specific contexts, with different clients, and with
a broader goal of lawyering towards justice.
Maureen discovered quickly that looking at how the Model Rules
defined competency or diligence did not actually help her understand
how much, or what kind of, work she needed to do for her clients or
whether it was ethical to work harder for one client than for others.
Through her writings and class conversations, Maureen maintained her
commitment to being a fulsome agent for her clients, but she built out
a more nuanced understanding of the process she needed to undertake
to truly understand her client's perspective and goals. She commented
in class that her exploration of the difference in affinity that she felt for
Mr. Moss and Mr. Tuttle helped her to realize that she was likely
"dismissive" of Mr. Tuttle's perspective. Maureen further reflected that
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intentionally cultivating empathy and compassion for Mr. Tuttle helped
her to listen more carefully to him and investigate his goals. That
reflective process also became a part of how Maureen interpreted what
constituted diligence and competence under the Model Rules.
C.

Zoe, Mr. Bradley, Ms. Dennis, and Ms. Ames

Our students not only practiced the habits of empathy and compassion
as they figured out how to lawyer well, they also practiced how to notice
and discern the fullest range of perspectives presented by the context,
which is something we called paying attention to the "web of relationships" or the "relationality" of the situation. They learned that the
possibilities for achieving a good resolution to their clients' problems
were severely limited if they only took a dyadic perspective, focusing on
how they or their clients saw the issues. Similarly, we wanted students
to consider how a client's own views about the available choices could be
limited if the student did not attend to relationality. However, we did
not want students to misperceive relationality as a call for lawyers to
usurp decision-making authority.
To make that point, we asked students to challenge a common
metaphor-the lawyer as the director or manager of a whole stage of
actors. We suggested that a view of relationality as a kind of top-down
"command and control" model is partial and imperfect. It misses the
complex network in which a client is enmeshed, including friends,
family, enemies, lawyers, judges, and social workers. That network can
create potential obstacles for the client, while also presenting opportunities for new insights and openings. Students are able to see a good
resolution when they can percieve a more expansive context that is
otherwise hidden if they had focused only on the lawyer-client dyad. We
wanted students to learn how to embrace and understand those
dynamic, interconnected relationships so they could be open to listening
and learning, not just managing, and so their clients might also be more
open to listening and learning. Here, as with empathy and compassion,
the habits of noticing and reflecting were important wisdom-building
practices.
Zoe's three clients had different capacities for choice-making-for
exercising client autonomy-and each existed in very different webs of
relationships. Learning how to respect a client's stated choice while also
working with a client to uncover the fullest range of choices always
takes care. In order for Zoe to be practically wise, she needed to
understand her client's viewpoint and the viewpoints of others in the
client's web of relationships while discerning the points of commonality
or friction between the various viewpoints. Then, Zoe had to determine
how to present all of that information to her client in a way that
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respectfully engaged her client in the problem-solving effort instead of
making her client feel judged, belittled, or bullied. The reflections Zoe
shared with the class as she figured out how to be practically wise in
working with three different clients helped us practice relationality skills
too.
[Mr. Bradley] was my very first clinic client - I'd visited him in jail
and appeared in . .. court as his student attorney before the semester
had even started. [Mr. Bradley] was both my first and last clinic
client; Mr. Bradley had both mental and substance abuse issues and
was perennially homeless. I ultimately handled eight of his cases
throughout the course of the semester.
Zoe listened carefully to how Mr. Bradley perceived the important
relationships in his life and discovered that they included people or
places entirely unconnected to his current troubles, including a supposed
lawyer in another state who might be "helping" him, places in the
United States that were conducive to being homeless during the winter
months, and possibly some "brothers" who might be able to bail Mr.

Bradley out of jail. Further, Zoe found that Mr. Bradley "vacillated
erratically" about what he wanted to do regarding his criminal charges.
He sometimes wanted to plead to everything. At other times, he wanted
to challenge everything as well as affirmatively sue the police for

violating his constitutional rights.

Still at other times, Mr. Bradley

seemed uninterested in engaging in conversation about the criminal

charges at all, but wanted to focus on other issues such as relocating.
Zoe tried to track down Mr. Bradley's relationships, but she came up
empty-handed. There did not seem to be any friends or family to
consider, nor were there victims or witnesses, hostile or friendly. Zoe
slowly realized that Mr. Bradley's relevant web of relationships was one

he did not see: the other legal professionals including the prosecutor, the
public defender handling a more serious charge, Zoe's supervising
attorney, and the judge.

In class, for example, we discussed Zoe's

account of working closely with the public defender who represented Mr.
Bradley on a more serious criminal charge. At first, the defender's
"abrupt" personality and "disengagement" from Mr. Bradley bothered
Zoe. Later, she surmised that the public defender acted as she did
because Mr. Bradley seemed unable to focus on what outcomes he
wanted to pursue in his criminal cases. Despite the public defender's

attitude, Zoe noticed that she still was able to negotiate a favorable
outcome with the prosecutor (at least, it was favorable from the
perspective of what goals an "average" criminal defense client generally
pursued). Zoe also noted how in her own cases, with Mr. Bradley's
vacillations, she and her supervising attorney moved to the same
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strategy: negotiating vigorously with the prosecution, obtaining some
deals, and setting other charges for trial.
Zoe worried, however, that she and others were acting more upon Mr.
Bradley than in response to him. She did not ignore him. She regularly
communicated with him. However, his capacity to rigorously engage in
planning and strategy conversations was unpredictable, and he had no
real personal network of relationships that Zoe could use to help engage
him. Did Mr. Bradley's "decisions" reflect the decisions Zoe and her
supervisor believed would be the "best" outcome rather than reflect Mr.
Bradley's choices? Yes, Zoe came to think so. Perhaps relying on the
experience of those involved in Mr. Bradley's professional web of
relationships was justified. Zoe reasoned that it was important that she
never felt that she bullied or coerced Mr. Bradley into any decision.
Zoe stated it was different to work with Ms. Dennis. At their first
meeting, Ms. Dennis "was dressed in a smart business casual dress and
seemed eager to make a good impression . . . ." Ms. Dennis had a
"strong understanding" of the assault and domestic violence charges she
was facing.
While Zoe knew that Ms. Dennis had "drifted" and
"struggled" since she had left the military a few years before, Zoe was
impressed by Ms. Dennis' efforts to work toward an online degree, Ms.
Dennis' well-spoken demeanor, and her steady clarity about her goals for
the criminal case (namely, get probation). Zoe recounted the following
in one of her narrative assignments:
From my own nervous and untried perspective, [Ms. Dennis] was a
huge relief. She seemed more than capable of understanding what I
had to say about the law, and the potential outcomes associated with
various courses of action, and I felt confident she could be trusted to
make her own informed decisions.
Zoe quickly discerned that the relevant web of personal relationships
important to Ms. Dennis included her relatively new husband with
whom she regularly discussed the case and potential plea bargains, and
her former boyfriend, the alleged victim of the assault and domestic
violence charges. As she interacted with people in Ms. Dennis' network,
Zoe expected them to portray her as the fairly-well pulled together
person Zoe knew, albeit a person under notable stress from criminal
charges.
Her ex-boyfriend sowed the first seeds of doubt when he mentioned
information (such as Ms. Dennis' recent DUI plea) that suggested she
was making less-reasonable choices than Zoe would have hoped. Zoe felt
"mildly betrayed and unsettled;" she expected that Ms. Dennis would
have shared such information with her. However, when Zoe thought
about Ms. Dennis in the context of the relationships Zoe had with her
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other clients, she was still inclined to interpret Ms. Dennis' choices as
good exercises of client autonomy. Zoe said, "I felt the urge to give her
the benefit of the doubt." Zoe continued her efforts to convince the
prosecutor to offer a deferred judgment. That way, the assault and
domestic violence charges would not become part of Ms. Dennis'
permanent criminal record.
However, the best plea bargain the
prosecutor was willing to offer was eighteen months of probation with
various requirements to take classes and not use alcohol.
Ms. Dennis seemed to have no trouble thinking through her choices
and articulating her primary goals, even if she was finding it hard to
decide whether going to trial was a risk she wanted to take. Zoe did not
strongly counsel her one way or the other.
I refrained from pushing [Ms. Dennis] further and inserting myself in
[Ms. Dennis'] life in [contrast to the] way I'd found myself doing for my
other clients .

. .

. The next week, [Ms. Dennis] took the offered plea

and was sentenced to the minimal requirements. [Ms. Dennis] was so
relieved she couldn't stop crying while the clerk processed her paperwork, and couldn't stop thanking me for all my help, although in both
cases, all I had really done was assist her in processing the decisions
that she had arrived at herself.
A week later, Zoe was surprised to receive a string of calls and texts
from Ms. Dennis saying that her husband was kicking her out of the
house, she had nowhere to stay, had no money, and was panicked that
she would not be able to maintain sobriety.
The dramatic change in Ms. Dennis' circumstances really allowed Zoe
to understand how much her engagement with Ms. Dennis was shaped
by her experience with clients like Mr. Bradley. She ignored signals
from the ex-boyfriend. She took as fact Ms. Dennis' repeated mention
of her "angel" husband, especially because Zoe perceived they were
genuinely working together on navigating the plea bargain so Ms.
Dennis could move forward in a way that would be positive for them as
a couple. Zoe could have counseled Ms. Dennis and still respected her
autonomy, but she expected Ms. Dennis to need less assistance in
scrutinizing, assessing, and contrasting the range of consequences that
might flow from taking the plea offer or going to trial. When Zoe
reflected on the experience she realized she wanted Ms. Dennis to
perceive her as capable of resolving the criminal charges as favorably as
possible. As Zoe said:
I wanted to reflect back to [Ms. Dennis] the vision of competency she
seemed to view me with, and also make sure she understood that I was
treating her as a true adult equal, capable of making her own
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decisions, rather than someone whose life had recently spiraled out of
control.

One of the reasons we found it so helpful to have Zoe describe her
work with Ms. Dennis in class is the story illuminated our core "process"

lessons. A core wisdom skill we encouraged Zoe and the other students
to learn was how to be mindful particularly by using the practice of
noticing, which was critical for identifying the relevant web of relationships (and Zoe did fairly quickly) and for interpreting them-which gave
Zoe more difficulty. She did not initially notice how much her own
experience created an obstacle for perceiving the important things she
could have learned from Ms. Dennis' relationships. The early challenges
she experienced when engaging other clients (like Mr. Bradley with his
mental health and substance abuse issues) inclined her to over-estimate
Ms. Dennis' competence in taking multiple perspectives, thinking
through choices, and weighing potential consequences. Zoe's experience

with Ms. Dennis made Zoe notice how her own previous web of
relationships with other clients made her assume things that an
intentional practitioner would have reflected on and double-checked.
Zoe then introduced us to Ms. Ames. When we first met Ms. Ames,
Zoe described her as a consummate repeat player in the local criminal

justice system.
[Ms. Ames] was a self-proclaimed and almost proud recidivist - but
also knew when to take a plea, when the plea offer wasn't good enough,
and when the jail time didn't appropriately equate with her alleged
crimes. She was homeless, likely alcoholic, maybe had a Master's
degree, likely drug addicted, likely bi-polar, had clear (and selfdiagnosed) issues with authority and anger management, and yet I felt
that she often knew much more about what was going on than I did
(which was, quite literally, often very true).

Zoe also quickly discovered the broad web of relationships Ms. Ames was
enmeshed in and deployed. That web included jail personnel who told
"funny and affectionate stories" about Ms. Ames and permitted Ms.
Ames to meet with Zoe in the jail kitchen instead of in the locked
Ms. Ames' web included
interview rooms, as protocol required.
prosecutors and judges with whom Ms. Ames was on a first-name basis

and two "steady boyfriends," one of whom consistently checked in with
Zoe because Ms. Ames stopped answering his calls. Further, it included
Ms. Ames' son and mother and volunteer social support. Finally, Ms.
Ames' web of relationships also ultimately included irate hospital
personnel and a beleaguered motel clerk. Zoe always suspected the web

of relationships she saw was just the tip of the iceberg.
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Unlike Mr. Bradley, who seemed to be lacking a personal web of
relationships, or Ms. Dennis, who seemed supported by her personal
relationships, Ms. Ames operated in a network that was chaotic and
cacophonous. Zoe felt that to effectively work with Ms. Ames, she
needed to engage with everyone in the web; it was often her primary
means of finding and communicating with Ms. Ames and the people in
this network came to look to Zoe as the only means of communication
with Ms. Ames when she was choosing not to speak with them.
Zoe quickly found that she needed wisdom of another sort. Because
working with Ms. Ames was chaotic from the start, Zoe found that she
had to be very intentional and reflective, even if only to stay on top of
what was happening. What was she doing, Zoe reflected incredulously,
"staking out" a local motel and interrogating the front desk clerk to find
Ms. Ames when Ms. Ames went on one of her communication black-outs?
Zoe had to learn the wisdom skills to navigate the network of relationships. The network provided the context needed to understand Ms.
Ames while at the same time it obfuscated and muddied the story, and
it often was not clear to Zoe which was which.
Right away, Zoe started thinking about what it meant to pay attention
to relationality while working with Ms. Ames. Some clients need to be
encouraged to take advantage of their network of relationships to face
challenges and choices. However, Ms. Ames happily attended to the
widest web of relationships she could. Unfortunately, as Zoe quickly
discovered, Ms. Ames could also use those relationships to avoid or dodge
challenges and choices. When Zoe stepped into Ms. Ames' world, she
quickly learned the importance of being mindful. Zoe's noticing practices
became particularly important as they helped her avoid being manipulated while still maintaining empathy and compassion for Ms. Ames and
for those in Ms. Ames' web of relationships.
One of the terrific consequences for Zoe about having three very
different experiences with clients and relationality is that those
experiences gave Zoe (and the rest of us) a remarkable amount of actual
material on which to reflect. For all three clients, Zoe felt empathy and
compassion and she wanted to "do right" by them. For all three clients,
the definition of "doing right" was affected by the client's web of
relationships, Zoe's own web of client relationships, and Zoe's developing
normative vision of herself as a good and just lawyer. In the process of
comparing the different opportunities and challenges each web of
relationships presented for creating solutions that served the clients
within their own webs, Zoe and the class experienced the "relationality"
skills needed to make wise choices. We learned methods for intentionally noticing and capaciously engaging context and interconnectivity to
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problem-solving in a way consonant with our clients and reflective of our
normative commitments to the role of the lawyer.
Further, as we attended to the inherent relationality of every lawyerclient setting, we were reminded of how important it is for lawyers to
check their own assumptions about when and if a client wishes to pursue
"self-interested" goals. As our students uncovered the web of relationships in which their clients were situated, they also discovered that what
clients wanted (namely, the client's "self-interest") usually reflected the
client's thinking through outcomes vis-d-vis their own web of relationships. For example, Maureen's client, Mr. Moss, considered all of his
options in light of how they would impact his family, not just him. Mr.
Moss' self-interest was not about himself but instead was about the most
important people with whom he was in a relationship. Maureen
attended to that relational context as she thought through options to
discuss with Mr. Moss. She discovered Mr. Moss was willing to stay in
jail longer if it meant his bond might be lowered, which then would place
less of a financial burden on his family. If Maureen had presumed that
Mr. Moss' "self-interest" was purely individualized and personal, she
might have mistakenly concluded that his most important priority was
getting out of jail quickly.
V.

OUR REFLECTIONS

If it was important to encourage the habit and skill of reflection
among our students, it was equally important to share with them, and
now with you, some of our own reflections.
We anticipated that many of our students would begin class already
steeped (often unconsciously) within the Dominant View of lawyering.
We also knew that both of us believed the practice of practical wisdom
as we devised it would push against the Dominant View's tight focus on
the lawyer-client dyad and on that view's disinclination towards morallyengaged conversations. Thus, we were somewhat surprised at how
difficult it was for many of our students to "move" from the Dominant
View of lawyering to views that located the client-and possible
solutions-in a web of relationships, and not simply in the lawyer-client
dyad. Our students also found it difficult to move to a view that
encouraged them to consider different priorities than client autonomy
and zealous advocacy and to consider the importance of intentionally
engaging in morally-based conversations with their clients rather than
unreflectively engaging in such conversations or not engaging in such
conversations at all.
It was not that our students fully embraced the Dominant View.
Many students agreed with Luban that the Dominant View depended on
an idealized version of the adversary system that does not exist in the
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rough-and-tumble real world. Similarly, many were skeptical of the
Dominant View because they agreed with L6pez that it too easily brings
out the arrogance of elite lawyers. Expressing their skepticism, students
took reassuring refuge in defining their position as being "clientcentered" lawyers. That was a more comfortable mantle because they
genuinely did not wish to be arrogant, and they really wanted to make
a difference for their clients. However, calling themselves "clientcentered" was often unhelpful because they lacked the perspective and
skills to put content into the term. There was no "there" there.
What we observed in our students was not an ethical or principled
resistance to other normative views of lawyering, but a hesitancy caused
by their fear of the unfamiliar and their lack of experience. The
students knew their clients expected them to be lawyers but were
unsettled about whether they actually knew enough to be lawyers. That
made the students very worried about "getting it wrong" with bad
consequences for the client. If they just listened to the client and things
screwed up, well, at least they had tried to do what the client wanted.
Students might defend their actions in principled terms. They did not
want to be elite moralists, subtly playing God, or push the client in ways
that violated the client's stated goals and interests. The students talked
as much, though, and sometimes more ardently, about affirmatively
engaging their clients. The rub for them was how to actually engage a
client well. That entry point gave us a natural opening to introduce our
process of the practice of practical wisdom.
As we introduced practices related to empathy, compassion, and
relationality, students tried those habits out-through role playing,
discussing the conversations they had with their clients, practicing how
else they might have approached them, and actually trying out their
ideas from class with their clients. We started to see shifts in the
students-many of which were first practical and later became the basis
for reflection about normative visions of lawyering. Some of the shifts
we observed were subtle. We noticed, for example, the different ways
students started talking about engaging their clients in moral conversations. Also, we noticed more students begin to see their legal matters
through a larger web of relationships. Students became more empathic
and compassionate not simply because they came to see empathy and
compassion as important (many already did), but because they learned
the listening, perspective taking, mindfulness, and conversational skills
needed to actually practice empathy and compassion.
They then began reporting that they felt they were being "better"
attorneys. As the semester went on, when we inquired what "better"
meant, students described increased confidence in their technical
prowess ("Now I know what 'resisting arrest' means" or "I know how to
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find regulations on my own and understand them") and described
increased confidence that they were making intentional choices about
how to behave in ways consistent with their developing commitments to
one of the normative roles of lawyering.
We also observed that some of the language we used-like the
language of telos and First Principles-was not a language the students
readily utilized. Nor were they familiar with our terms "relationality,"
"web of relationships," and "sensitivity to relationships." However, the
way in which students learned and adopted the ideas behind the terms
was gratifying: the ways in which they began to explore innovative
solutions to client problems by looking at the context in terms of a web
of relationships and the ways in which they started talking about the
aim and purpose of what they were doing and how that affected their
interpretation of the Model Rules and informed the judgments they were
making.
Fear and anxiety based on unfamiliarity was something we experienced, too. Just like the students were facing a new, unpredictable, and
uncertain situation with their clients, we were facing a somewhat
similar situation in class. We were trying new things-making student
narratives the foundation of a legal ethics class, having students tell
their stories in class, working together with them to figure out the
ethical and judgment issues at stake and how to handle them better, and
figuring out how to help them connect the particulars of their legal work
to larger issues in the literatures on legal ethics and practical wisdom.
We had to do all of that while also ensuring they could pass the ethics
section of the bar exam. We knew we would face problems and make
errors. For example, there was no advance guarantee we could create
a safe space for discussion, stories fell flat, students saw very different
things in the stories than we expected, we had to respond by altering our
own conversation, and so on. When we took the conversation down a
dead end path, we knew it and we knew the students knew it. Our own
uncertainty was always there, and we needed to cultivate an openness
to learning from our mistakes, to take what came, and to move from
there so we could improve our own teaching skills. We were constantly
balancing how to ask and tell, how to know when to be silent, and how
to redirect in ways that opened the conversation and did not just turn
the class into a lecture of the form "let us tell you what we were hoping
you would say and what we wanted you to learn."
When we reflect on
what kept us going in spite of our uncertainty and anxiety, we noticed
three things. First, we are veteran teachers. We already had some
experience and skills in directing reflective conversations, and we were
confident in who we were so our egos (and our jobs) were not on the line
every day. Second, an important element undergirding our confidence
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and energy is that we knew what we were aiming at and it was very
important to us. We wanted to foster ethical, competent, and practicallywise lawyers because we see this change as the heart and soul of a
critical profession that is at risk of losing its purpose. Third, we had
each other. We taught each other. We prepped each other. Even when
we were not teaching together, we knew we could converse by e-mail or
phone. We could reflect, strategize, laugh, vent, disagree, argue, and
support each other through the ups and downs. All this made the
experience extraordinarily joyful for us. We do not think that one has
to be a veteran teacher to find success with our methodology. However,
one has to dive in wholeheartedly, and it would be terrific to identify in
advance someone who would be willing to play the support role we
played for each other.
VI.

CONCLUSION

We think the stories above richly illustrate our central thesis-that
lawyers can practice practical wisdom, and that there are habits of mind
lawyers that can intentionally cultivate to better allow them to be wise
in any given setting. We also think that the stories illustrate that
practical wisdom is practical and wise only when experience and context
are situated within a larger normative vision; settling on a normative
vision requires one first to consider plural contrasting visions of the role
of the lawyer.
We believe these stories also show that the practice of practical
wisdom is achieved more readily when one breaks practical wisdom into
component parts. Cultivating empathy and compassion encourages a
lawyer to deeply engage with clients without the lawyer (and hopefully
without the client) becoming captured by any one point of view.
Practicing those capacities with a sensitivity to relationships and a
reflectiveness regarding the web of relationships encourages a lawyer to
attend to dynamics other than simply the lawyer-client dyad and to
Using mindfulness
probe for solutions in unexpected quarters.
techniques ensures empathy, compassion, and relationality happen as
robustly as possible.
Finally, by investigating our students' actual stories, we tried to
concretely test our hypotheses not in an objective, quantitative way but
in the way that knowledge and learning can reveal themselves through
lived experiences. We hope our journey and the journeys of our students
are convincing evidence that questions of professional formation and
questions about the normative role of the lawyer must be harnessed
together if one's goal is to practice practical wisdom.

